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ABSTRACT 
The growing interconnectedness of nations through globalization, and the threat of 
international terrorism as a destabilizing force, has increased the international 
community’s concern for stable governance in the developing world.  In an era of 
globalization, with near instantaneous information flow, and a global court of 
international opinion, the options for governing a society in a post-conflict environment 
are limited. History is filled with rebellions, insurgencies, coups, invasions, and 
occupations, which result in regime change or some sort of post-conflict intervention by 
the international community.  In each case, prior to conflict, there was an established 
order, or form of governance.  After conflict, a new order or form of governance, has to 
emerge.  In these societies, a preconflict political and social order was disrupted, and a 
new post-conflict political and social order established.  Ideally, the crafting of a new 
political and social order into effective governance requires the acceptance of the 
governed.  As the United States remains committed to assisting nations with establishing 
governance and fostering stability, policymakers should consider the social acceptance of 
a post-conflict government by the people. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
For an arbitrary government to be legitimate, it would therefore be 
necessary in each generation for the people to be master of its acceptance 
or rejection.1 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1762 
The growing interconnectedness of nations through globalization, and the threat 
of international terrorism as a destabilizing force, has increased the international 
community’s concern for stable governance in the developing world.  In an era of 
globalization, with near instantaneous information flow, and a global court of 
international opinion, the options for governing a society in a post-conflict environment 
are limited. History is filled with rebellions, insurgencies, coups, invasions, and 
occupations, which result in regime change or some sort of post-conflict intervention by 
the international community.  In each case, prior to conflict, there was an established 
order, or form of governance.  After conflict a new order, or form of governance, has to 
emerge.  In these societies, a preconflict political and social order was disrupted, and a 
new post-conflict political and social order established.  Ideally, the crafting of a new 
political and social order into effective governance requires the acceptance of the 
governed.  As the United States remains committed to assisting nations with establishing 
governance and fostering stability, policymakers should consider the social acceptance of 
a post-conflict government by the people. 
In early 2007, the United States-led Combined Forces Command Afghanistan 
(CFC-A) transitioned to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  
Under the leadership of ISAF, tactical units began an effort to “connect the population of 
Afghanistan to the government” in the hope of selling a democratic form of governance 
to the Afghan people. Efforts focusing on strengthening the Afghan state continue today.  
It is a widely held belief that a strong centralized state will bring stability to Afghan 
society. 
                                                 
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Hackett Pub Co, 1988), 20. 
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In February 2007, Taliban insurgents operating in northern Konar and Nuristan 
provinces routinely attacked Afghan Border Police outposts, police stations, district 
centers, and U.S. occupied firebases.  In an effort to limit the population’s support for the 
insurgents and facilitate effective governance, one U.S. Army Special Forces detachment, 
the Afghan district police chief, and the Afghan district sub-governor traveled to the 
village of Helgal.  The Special Forces detachment had credible intelligence reports 
indicating Helgal was being used as a “rest site” by traveling insurgents and foreign 
fighters in the area.  The detachment’s objectives were: 
• Introduce village leadership to district Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(IROA) officials 
• Explain the functions of the government officials to the villagers 
• Encourage support for the government officials 
• Discourage support for insurgents and foreign fighters 
As the detachment and accompanying police officers moved slowly into the 
valley, intercepted Taliban radio transmissions indicated that insurgents were preparing 
to ambush the detachment and the Afghan police officers.  The detachment commander 
asked the police chief if Taliban insurgents made the radio transmissions.  The chief 
replied “No, just Afghans being Afghans.  They do not know us, and we are armed, 
therefore they must try to defend their village.”2  The detachment commander 
immediately called a halt to the column and asked the police chief to explain over the 
radio to the Afghan villagers the reason for the detachment’s presence.  For the next 45 
minutes, the chief explained over the radio that the detachment did not seek a fight and 
only wanted to talk with the elders.  After some negotiation, the unseen village 
representative agreed to allow the detachment and police officers to enter the village. 
When the coalition of soldiers and police officers reached the village, the six 
elders and other village males gathered around in a half circle.  The elders exchanged 
greetings with the coalition members and served tea.  Through a Pashtu-speaking 
                                                 
2 Discussions held with the author, Helgal, Afghanistan 2007. 
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interpreter the detachment commander thanked the village elders for their hospitality.  
The commander then introduced the Afghan government representatives and explained 
that, as members of the government, the officials’ job was to perform administrative 
functions for the people of the district.  The commander described the functions of 
government, the idea of constituents, the services the government could provide, and why 
it was necessary to support the government.  The commander specifically addressed 
infrastructure improvement: road construction, wells, electricity, and the possibility of 
micro-hydro projects.  Most importantly, the commander discussed the nature of the 
relationship between elected officials and their constituents in a democracy.  Essentially, 
the citizens elect the officials through voting, and the officials have a responsibility to 
represent the interests of their constituents.  In concluding, the commander asked the 
villagers to support their government and to discourage those who sought to attack and 
destroy it. 
After a brief deliberation, the elder with the longest, whitest beard began to speak.  
He welcomed the detachment, police chief, and sub-governor.  He stated matter-of-factly, 
“If my people need a well we will dig it, if my people need an improved road we will 
build it.  The road you traveled on to get here we built.  There is no need for the 
government here.”3  One villager, who appeared to be of moderate status in the village, 
stated, “I have a small field that I farm, I have three wives and many children, I have 
elders who tell me what I need, why do I need to vote?”4 
The senior elder thanked the detachment and Afghan officials for their visit.  He 
stated, “You are welcome to stay in my guest house.  We will slaughter a goat, and you 
may stay and rest as long as you like.  You must understand, the people you speak of who 
attack you, are also welcome to stay here and rest.”5 
Combat units across Afghanistan face similar situations every day.  These 
situations shed light on the greater problem facing U.S. efforts in the developing world.  
                                                 




How does an international force assist a nation in establishing governance that is 
consistent with the social values and norms of local populations, will thus be accepted by 
members of the society, but will still provide enough structure to foster stability? 
A. BACKGROUND 
Considering the global nature of security concerns in an era of terrorism, the 
United States has a direct interest in the ability of governments around the world to 
maintain order.  As a leader of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. finds 
itself engaged in nation-building.  First in Afghanistan, after toppling the Taliban 
government that harbored Al Qaeda, the group responsible for planning and coordinating 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, then in Iraq, after the removal of Saddam Hussein and 
the Ba’ath political party.  If the recent history of U.S. post-conflict actions is any 
indicator of future post-conflict actions, and, particularly if the absence of a capable 
government threatens stability and facilitates the activities of terrorists, then the U.S. 
must anticipate nation-building in support of regime change elsewhere as well.  
Unfortunately, the United States’ success in nation-building appears inconsistent at best.  
While arguably successful in Japan, Germany, and South Korea, the United States post-
conflict intervention experience since the end of the Cold War in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo, has produced mixed results.6 
Ultimately, the U.S. intent at the outset of each of these efforts was to use the 
military to institute a process of democratization.  Success was defined as the “ability to 
build, promote, and transfer enduring democratic institutions” to the host nation.7  U.S. 
policymakers believed democratization would lead to stability.  However, 
democratization has become less about the “growth of political freedoms and liberties, 
self-government and sovereignty,” and more about establishment of a “civil society” 
according to Western values and norms.8  In effect, the form of governance that would 
                                                 
6 James Dobbins, After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush, illustrated edition. 
(RAND Corporation, 2008), 84. 
7 James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 1st ed. (RAND 
Corporation, 2005), 2. 
8 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, Second Edition. (Pluto Press, 2000), 4. 
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best provide stability for a given society became less important than the altering of 
society to reflect Western ideals.  To underscore this point, consider the example of a 
society enacting legislation through a democratic process that dictates that individuals 
found guilty of adultery shall be put to death.  Is that society undemocratic because it 
does not respect the freedom of individuals?  Or is it democratic since it arrived at the 
punishment through a democratic process? 
Currently, a conglomeration of U.S. and foreign agencies, led by the United States 
military, are in the midst of two counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.  In Afghanistan 
and Iraq, U.S. strategy has hinged on establishing democratic governments.   The results 
vary, but without question the U.S. has found itself battling insurgents who are intent on 
defeating the established fledgling democracies.  In Iraq, the COIN efforts appear to be 
somewhat successful and the new Iraqi government appears to be growing in competence 
and popular acceptance.  Conversely, success in Afghanistan appears less likely, with 
limited progress against the insurgents and the decreasing effectiveness of the Karzai 
government—why?  This thesis aims to explain this variance in stability and to explore 
the role of governance in achieving it. 
Over the past ten years, literature on counterinsurgency has exploded.  The 
military has developed new doctrine describing what and how operations are to be 
conducted in a COIN fight.  Though disagreements exist, many if not most experts 
acknowledge or agree that COIN is a population-centric struggle and popular support is 
critical to achieve ultimate victory.9  However, the same literature does not address the 
significance of establishing a government that the population will be most (or more) 
likely to support.  The literature instead simply cites governance as a component of best 
COIN practices.  Ultimately, however, the practitioners of nation-building and the 
executioners of COIN would be better served by asking:  What is the impact of an ill 
fitting post-conflict governance structure on ongoing nation-building efforts?  In other 
words, even if all tactics and operations follow accepted COIN best practices, can an ill-
fitting post-conflict government still be successful?   
                                                 
9 David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, U.S. Army U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (Signalman Publishing, 2009), 1–2. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From the Western perspective, democracy is often perceived as the way to 
achieve political stability.10  However, in post-conflict environments, it seems that 
whatever system of governance resonates best with the society is most likely to succeed.  
This leads to the question: how does the alignment of a system or method of governance 
with the underlying social structure and norms affect stability? 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the significance of attaining a ‘social fit’ in 
post-conflict environments.  ‘Social fit’ in the context of this thesis means that “citizens 
provide the ultimate source of legitimacy for a social order” when it comes to 
governance.11  Specifically, this thesis will articulate how the willingness of the 
population to accept the establishment of social order by the government is critical for 
lasting stability. 
Consequently, this thesis will identify social factors that contribute to, or inhibit, 
effective governance.  Our working hypothesis is that how a government fits society, or 
how able a society is to establish its own form of governance, will limit the potential for 
further conflict or resistance, thereby fostering stability. 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
Post-conflict situations present difficult challenges for establishing stable 
governance, particularly when the responsibility lies with a foreign force.  We contend 
that social fit is integral to fostering stability.  In order to provide a clearer way of 
thinking about social fit when analyzing specific post-conflict governments, this thesis 
takes into account three components: ideological resonance, expectations of the social 
contract, and comfort and familiarity.  Chapter II broadly discusses the significance of 
social fit, as well as identifying and defining the three components of social fit.  Each 
                                                 
10 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Reprint. (Harper Perennial, 
2010), 7. 
11 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 126. 
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subsequent chapter identifies and analyzes more specifically how each component of 
social fit affected stability in a specific case.  Chapter III provides an example of social 
mis-fit, where societal values are not reflected in the government, resulting in escalating 
violence.  Chapter IV outlines the role of social fit in an environment free of violence, but 
suffering from political stagnation.  Chapter V provides an example of achieving social 
fit.  Chapter VI offers future policy implications and recommendations.  Ultimately, this 
thesis concludes that the relationship between social fit and resulting stability should 
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II. WHY SOCIAL FIT? 
Societies are not made of sticks and stones, but of men whose individual 
characters, by turning the scale one way or another, determine the 
direction of the whole.12 
Socrates, The Republic by Plato 375 BC 
Sustainable political order in the developing world has been a frequent topic 
among practitioners and scholars of stability and COIN operations.   There appears to be 
general consensus in the international community that instability can affect the peace and 
prosperity of all nations.  By-products of an unstable environment include: terrorism, 
international crime, genocide, starvation, as well as internal and external war.  The 
structure of the nation state and its application of governance are seen as the mechanisms 
by which societies may achieve stability, peace, and prosperity.13 
Current literature devoted to post-conflict stabilization and nation building 
indicates that there are three main areas of focus for establishing effective stable 
governance: democratization, economic improvement, and massive international 
intervention.  Most scholars typically advocate some combination of all three, but differ 
largely in where they place emphasis.  For instance, while some believe that the 
establishment of democracy will foster the necessary conditions for stable governance, 
this assertion is also frequently challenged.14  In many cases in the developing world, the 
application of democracy can lead to less stable governance.15 
Other scholars argue economic development is the cornerstone of stable 
governance, with many of these making a fundamental assumption that material wealth 
                                                 
12 Plato, The Republic, 2nd ed. (Penguin Classics, 2007), 277. 
13 W. C. Opello and S. J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to 
Contemporary Politics (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 1. 
14 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, illustrated 
edition. (Cornell University Press, 2004). 
15 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Reprint. (Harper Perennial, 
2010), 11. 
 10
and comfort are the preeminent desires of all humans.16  It is generally accepted that a 
post-conflict society that can produce wealth for the population will be stable.  As Paul 
Collier, professor of economics at Oxford University states, “poor is dangerous.”17  His 
argument is that an effective economy and economic policy can increase the stability of 
post-conflict governance. 
Scholars who advocate democratic or economic solutions vary little in their 
recommendations for how to establish both democracy and economic development.  The 
most common recommendation for establishing stability and transforming societies in the 
developing world involves large-scale international intervention by international 
peacekeeping forces, United Nations commissions, and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  The advocates of massive international intervention differ little 
except on the mechanics.  Essentially, the goal of intervention is to teach and educate 
people, in the hopes that one day they might transform themselves into a functioning 
state.18 
As is now commonly acknowledged, most post-colonial states were created with 
no regard for the often vastly different societies within their borders.  Overcoming ethnic 
and tribal differences in establishing stable governance in post-conflict environments is 
thus significantly more difficult than in states where societies are relatively homogenous.  
Therefore, minimal ethnic diversity or relative homogeneity across certain key 
dimensions can increase stability in a post-conflict environment. 
As a society recovers from conflict, a political power structure invariably 
emerges.  This, in turn, influences capacity.  According to Joel S. Migdal, effective states 
attempt to develop capabilities that include “the capacity to penetrate society, regulate 
social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined 
ways.”19  The degree that this is possible depends, first, on the type of governance prior 
                                                 
16 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 12. 
17 Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes, 125. 
18 Ibid., 214. 
19 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton University Press, 1988), 4. 
 11
to conflict.  If the society was successfully governed prior to hostilities, then the 
likelihood is higher it can be governed effectively again.  In other words, a positive pre-
existing governance experience can increase the stability of post-conflict governance. 
A. DEVELOPING SOCIAL FIT 
In establishing post-conflict governance, remnants of the old political order may 
conflict with the new political order in determining who will wield political power. 
Disputes over post-conflict governance can be used to mobilize people, leading to new, 
or renewed, social conflict.  Lewis Coser defines social conflict as “a struggle over the 
values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflict 
groups are not only to gain desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate 
rivals.”20  According to Migdal, of the factors affecting a state’s ability to survive, “none 
has been more important in marshaling strength for the state, though, than the ability to 
mobilize the society’s population.”21  In effect, Migdal finds that the support of the 
society is the key factor in determining the survival of the state.  It is, therefore, 
reasonable to assume that if an insurgency requires mobilization of some portion of a 
society, then the opposite may also be true; in order for a government or governance 
structure to succeed it must mobilize support from some portion of the population it 
intends to govern.  Thus, a post-conflict government should seek support from society 
and/or reduce the factors that would encourage mobilization against it. 
Given the implications whenever a population is mobilized for or against a post-
conflict government, it seems to only make sense to create a government the population 
will support, or at least won’t oppose.  Social movement and mass mobilization theories 
point to factors that can contribute to achieving this. Both theories acknowledge the 
importance of congruence between the nature of government and the target society.  By 
reviewing classic social movement theory, resource mobilization theory, and some  
 
 
                                                 
20 L. A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (The Free Press New York, 1967), 232. 
21 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 22.  
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aspects of framing, it becomes apparent how necessary it is to consider social fit when 
establishing a post-conflict government and to do so without assuming that a standard 
type of governance can be applied. 
Classic social movement theory states that the presence of antecedent conditions 
creates a structural strain on society.  This strain causes a disruption within society.  The 
disruption, in turn, leads to a social movement.22  Different models exist within classic 
social movement theory, but each model offers the same overall framework.  According 
to mass society theory, for instance, the lack of an effective structure for integration into 
political and social life results in social isolation, causing “alienation and anxiety,” 
thereby leading to a social movement.23  According to the status inconsistency model, the 
proximate cause of a social movement is cognitive dissonance caused by a discrepancy in 
a person’s status: his/her rankings according to education, income, occupation, aren’t 
aligned.24  The collective behavior model, on the other hand, focuses on a social strain 
caused by socially disruptive processes such as industrialization, urbanization, or some 
other significant social change, leading to a feeling of widespread disruption of the social 
order.  This strain causes “normative ambiguity,” which results in collective action and a 
social movement.25 
Differing from classic social movement theory, resource mobilization theory 
claims that an insurgency does not directly result from a rise in discontent, but emerges 
when there is an increase in the level of resources available for counter-state activity.  
The term ‘resource’ can refer to material resources such as money and weapons, as well 
as non-material resources such as legitimacy and habits of industry.26  Of course, if 
resources can be considered critical for effective counter-governance activity, the same 
may hold true for government activity.  In other words, the availability of resources has 
to be critical for both sides. 
                                                 
22 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 1st ed. 
(University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 8. 
25 Ibid., 9. 
26 Ibid., 32. 
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While mobilization theories argue that social movements result from various 
objective conditions, the relatively new concept of framing points to something more 
subjective, such as perception, playing a critical role in social movements.  The 
application of framing to social and mass movement theories also provides insight into 
defining social fit.  Two originators of framing, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, 
describe framing this way: 
 …the articulation and accenting or amplification of elements of events, 
experiences, and existing beliefs and values, most of which are existing 
ideologies…from a framing perspective, ideologies constitute cultural 
resources that can be tapped and exploited for the purpose of constructing 
collective action frames…  Following Swidler (1986), we are arguing that 
if culture is best conceived as a “bag of tools,” then clearly ideologies 
function in this fashion in relation to collective action frames…27  
While social movement scholars use framing to describe the “production of 
mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas,” Benford and Snow use framing to develop the 
impact of frame alignment on social movements.  Benford and Snow’s comments 
recognize and emphasize the importance of beliefs and values in constructing collective 
action frames.  The degree of resonance is critical to effectiveness, or the “mobilizing 
potency” of a collective action frame.28 
While the causes of social movements and mass mobilization are subject to 
debate, what is important to note for the purposes of this section is the need to take social 
fit into account.  Each theory describes conditions that lead to mobilization, or 
movement, within society.  Ideally upon inception, the governing body should avoid 
creating conditions that will inspire mobilization or movement against it, instead 
establishing conditions that encourage the society to accept it.  The more it can do this the 
more likely achieving stable governance becomes.   
Mass society theory highlights how important it is to avoid social isolation, which 
can lead to alienation and anxiety.  According to the status inconsistency model, 
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cognitive dissonance is caused by resentment about one’s status.  The collective behavior 
model suggests why it is important to avoid normative ambiguity, or the disruption of 
normative behavior.  Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the significance of 
maximizing available resources to foster pro-government activity.  Amplifying beliefs 
and values that resonate with society is probably best achieved through proper framing. 
B.  DEFINING SOCIAL FIT 
Given the significance of these insights, it becomes possible to think of social fit 
in terms of three critical components:  ideological resonance, expectations regarding the 
social contract, and comfort and familiarity.  The argument this thesis presents is that the 
greater the ideological resonance, the more closely aligned society’s expectations are 
with that of the government, and the more comfortable and/or familiar society is with the 
governance structure, then the greater the social fit.  The greater the social fit, the greater 
the likelihood that the post-conflict government will be stable.   
1. Ideological Resonance 
By ideological resonance, we refer to the degree to which the governing system 
does or does not resonate with the population’s values.  Richard Hyse defines ideology as 
the “prescriptive belief systems with a preferred view of what human behavior ought to 
be.”29  Resonance is defined as a “corresponding or sympathetic response or, the power 
or quality of evoking or suggesting images, memories, and emotions.”30  For the 
purposes of this thesis, we use ideological resonance to mean the degree to which a post-
conflict government’s preferred view of how humans should behave corresponds with the 
view of the governed.  The more these views align, the greater the ideological resonance. 
Different societies hold different beliefs and values important.  Thus, it is 
necessary for a government recovering from, or born out of, conflict to embrace or reflect 
these values and beliefs.  However, looking at different post-conflict environments 
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around the world, it is not always possible to accurately identify what might be the 
critical beliefs or values of each society.  At most we can say that they must exist.  In 
some societies, respect for a particular religion may be critically important; in other 
societies protecting individual rights may be essential.  The purpose of this thesis is not to 
establish which beliefs or values are critical in which specific societies, but to recognize 
that the alignment of a post-conflict government with its constituent society’s critical 
belief(s) or value(s) may have a significant impact on that government’s success. 
2. Social Contract: Expectations 
The second component of social fit is the social contract.  The term ‘social’ means 
“of, belonging to, or concerned with the organization of society; that constitutes 
society.”31  A ‘contract,’ is a mutual agreement between two or more parties that 
something shall be done or forborne by one or both; a compact, covenant, bargain.32  
Thus, a social contract is the agreement between the government and those it governs that 
delineates the expected functions and/or performance of both parties: government as well 
as citizens.33  Inherent in this agreement is the voluntary acceptance by individuals of the 
government’s rules and laws.34  In establishing post-conflict governance, it is critical to 
ask what citizens expect from their government and what government expects of them. 
In line with this approach, two additional questions emerge.  The first has to do 
with scope or capability: is the government providing the service(s) required by society?  
An illustration of a poorly aligned social contract is when citizens desire education, but 
the government focuses on providing electricity.  The second question relates to capacity 
or strength: is the government adequately providing the service(s) required?  Using the 
same example, when the government focuses on building schools to assist with 
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education, but is unable to build enough schools to adequately address the problem, that, 
too, points to problems with the social contract.  The more a post-conflict government is 
able to provide the functions desired by members of society to the degree expected, the 
greater the likelihood there will be a tight social fit. 
3. Comfort and Familiarity 
The third component of social fit is comfort and familiarity.  ‘Familiarity’ refers 
to the degree to which members of a society are comfortable and/or familiar with the day-
to-day processes used by the government to conduct its affairs.  Because ‘structure’ refers 
to “public institutions and policies created by governments as a framework for economic 
and social relations,” it is worth thinking about familiarity in relationship to structure.35  
The framework adhered to can be considered the mechanism by which the government 
distributes or provides its services.  State services typically include, but are not limited to: 
the delivery of material goods, such as water and electricity, the delivery of essentials, 
such as education, the ability to coordinate security, legislate, apply the rule of law, and / 
or provide justice. 
Regardless of the critical resource, service, or function provided, ‘comfort and 
familiarity’ implies that it will be distributed or undertaken using means with which 
members of society are already comfortable and familiar.  One method of ensuring that 
people are comfortable with the government’s actions or intent is to facilitate maximum 
participation.  Achieving familiarity requires assessing local history and culture.  For 
example, if the government establishes a centralized political system that does not 
incorporate traditional leaders, then members of society may feel resentful due to the loss 
of status of their traditional leaders.  Citizens are less likely to participate in a political 
process that does not incorporate traditional power structures, with which they are most 
familiar.  In contrast, if a government incorporates traditional leaders, members society 
would more likely able to appreciate what the government is used for and how to use it. 
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The rejection of a governing body by members of society in a post-conflict 
situation will result in their refusal to participate in the political process, or, worse, 
society’s return to resistance or insurgency.  This is much less likely if the government’s 
ideology resonates, the social contract is mutually agreed to, and the members of society 
are comfortable and familiar with the procedures and processes by which the government 
conducts its business.  Our contention is that creating these conditions in a post-conflict-
environment will more likely foster stability and effective governance.  The next chapter 
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III. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FIT SOCIETY: 
AFGHANISTAN 
The beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the 
individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus 
incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit.36 
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 1690 
The United States and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) efforts to establish governance in Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban 
Regime have been undermined by a resurgence of the Taliban.  The primary goal of the 
United States Government in Afghanistan, as stated by President Obama in his speech to 
the nation on December 1, 2009, is “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda 
and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”37  Given the current 
strategic focus of building a centralized stable Afghanistan that is capable of securing and 
controlling its population, it is crucial to consider what type of governance would provide 
a social fit for Afghan society.  Considering social fit in of itself is paramount; however, 
social fit alone is not the sole answer to the problems facing Afghanistan. 
Four major factors have historically prevented Afghanistan from achieving long-
lasting political stability.  First, socio-cultural “cleavages” are characterized by 
differences in ethnicity, language, sectarianism, tribalism, and race.38  Second, Islamic 
doctrine has been blended with local customs.  Third, communal loyalty and identity take 
precedence over “higher order identity formations.”39  And fourth, the country’s 
mountainous terrain “isolates and magnifies the distance of the people from the 
government.”40  These conditions shape the Afghans’ preferred view of governance.  
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Understanding these factors is paramount to designing a government that fits Afghan 
society.  Despite Afghanistan’s rocky political history, elements of social fit existed 
previously during periods of stability. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In 1919, Amir Amanullah, the ruling leader of Afghanistan, entered into 
negotiations with the British that eventually led to the signing of a treaty guaranteeing 
Afghanistan’s complete independence in 1921.41  Independence from British influence 
provided an opportunity for Amanullah to establish governance in Afghanistan, free from 
colonial influence.  From 1921–1924, Amir Amanullah circulated Afghanistan’s first 
written constitution.42  In the document, Amanullah attempted to develop a framework 
that defined the relationship between the monarchy and the government, as well as the 
relationship between religion and the state.43  Amanullah’s primary aim was the 
“secularization and modernization of the Afghan state and Afghan society.”44  However, 
Amanullah’s attempts to reform Afghan society eventually led to his downfall.  Social 
reforms promoting the rights of women and secular education threatened the traditional 
power structures held by the tribal and religious leaders of Afghan society.45  Whereas 
religious and tribal leaders traditionally held power sufficient to influence all matters 
concerning Afghan society, Amanullah’s programs of secularization and modernization 
limited those powers.  As a result, Amanullah made numerous enemies among the 
religious and tribal elites.46  This disruption of societal norms alienated nearly every 
segment of Afghan society.47  Sir Martin Ewans sums up Amanullah’s failure: 
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Amanullah should have been well aware that control of Afghanistan 
required a strong central authority, as well as a Machiavellian ability to 
handle the tribes and maneuver them toward an acceptance of rule from 
Kabul.48 
In Ewans’ assessment, Afghanistan requires a strong central authority; however, 
the cycle of reform, followed by rejection of the reform, and the eventual ouster of the 
government has continued to this day.  Essentially, secularization, modernization, and 
social reform dictated by a central government alienate traditional Afghan society. 
1. The Monarchy 
A period of lawlessness followed Amanullah’s ouster.  A new King emerged with 
the support of the religious and tribal leaders.  In 1929, Nadir Khan accepted the 
endorsement of the tribal Jirga and became known as King Nadir Shah.49  Nadir’s family, 
known as Musahibans, would rule Afghanistan through 1978.50  The challenges Nadir 
Shah faced in regaining control were immense.  In describing the situation following 
Nadir’s rise to power, then-British minister to Kabul, Richard Maconachie reported: 
Throughout the country the advantages of anarchy seem to have been 
better appreciated than its drawbacks, and the tribes were asking 
themselves why they should resign the freedom which they had enjoyed 
for the past year, and submit again to a central authority which would 
inevitably demand payment of land revenue, customs duties and bribes for 
its officials, and possibly the restoration of arms looted from the 
government posts and arsenals.51 
In an effort to regain support from the religious leaders and tribes, Nadir 
abolished all secular legislation enacted by Amanullah, he also endorsed the enforcement 
of Islamic law through religious courts, and revoked women’s rights.52  He further 
established control through brutish tactics of intimidation and repression.  In 1931, he 
                                                 
48 Ewans, Afghanistan, 134. 
49 S. Tanner, Afghanistan: A military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (Da 
Capo Pr, 2003), 222. 
50 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010), 
195. 
51 Ewans, Afghanistan, 139. 
52 Ibid. 
 22
established a new constitution, but, as the supreme leader, maintained authority to 
appoint and remove cabinet members, and veto legislation or write legislation 
unilaterally.53  Nadir pursued a delicate balancing act of placating conservative religious 
and tribal leaders, while at the same time implementing limited reforms that adhered to 
the tenets of Islam.  Nadir faced limited opposition from some remaining members of the 
Amanullah regime, as well as a limited number of disenchanted tribesmen.  Nadir dealt 
with challenges to his power ruthlessly.  Arrest, imprisonment, and executions were 
commonplace.  
In 1932, Nadir executed a former Anamullah supporter, Ghulam Nabi, for 
subversive acts.  One year later, King Nadir Shah was assassinated, allegedly in revenge 
for the Nabi execution.54  Nadir’s son Zahir Shah replaced his father as the King of 
Afghanistan.  But, due to his age, Nadir’s brothers (Zahir’s uncles) ruled the country. 
In retrospect, Nadir’s most significant accomplishments as King came in the 
realms of economy and infrastructure development.  Nadir was able to increase exports 
and imports sufficient to generate a steady revenue stream for the government.  Nadir 
established Afghanistan’s first bank.  In addition, he focused on developing a system of 
governance where by “local authority was to be neither resisted or questioned.”55  
Though it is not entirely clear, it appears that Nadir understood that challenges to local 
authority by the central government would ultimately lead to dissension and revolt.  He 
therefore implemented a pattern of governance by which the regime would provide 
“security of life and property in exchange for obedience.”56  Beyond this authority, Nadir 
left governance to the people.  The King’s policy was that new institutions and social 
ideas should evolve naturally “within the boundaries of Islam and the socio-cultural 
realities of Afghanistan.”57 
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After Nadir’s assassination and under the rule of his son, Zahir Shah, Afghanistan 
maintained political stability for the next 40 years.58  Thomas Barfield calls this period, 
from 1929–1978, “Afghanistan’s longest interval of peace and internal stability,” when 
the government “avoided both international conflicts and any significant internal 
rebellion.”59  Although Afghanistan was officially a monarchy, historians often refer to 
this period as rule by an autocracy due to the significant power exercised by the prime 
ministers. 
The policies of limiting reform and responding to threats with brute repression 
initially adopted by Nadir Shah continued to assist in preventing the development of any 
significant internal threat to the regime.  The regime attempted change on a small, 
incremental scale by first testing anything new in Kabul, and only then in the more 
conservative rural areas of the countryside.  As an example, the mandatory veiling of 
women, a traditional Afghan custom, was relaxed.60  The regime took the stance that 
women had the right to wear the veil just as they had the right not to wear it.  This 
voluntary reform met some resistance, but, ultimately because it was not forced, it was 
accepted by society.  Similarly, previous regimes taxed the rural population to generate 
revenue.  Zahir’s family lessened the tax burden by increasing tariffs on imports and 
exports.61  Lessening the tax burden while limiting central government interference in 
social matters were among the most significant reasons for political stability. 
Under King Zahir Shah, power in Afghanistan passed from one family member to 
the next through a series of prime ministers.  Nadir’s brothers, Hashim Khan followed by 
Shah Mahmud, maintained the premiership from 1933 to 1953.  Following Zahir’s 
uncles, Daud Khan, Zahir’s cousin, assumed the role of prime minister.  
Daud’s ambition for modernization and economic development led him to 
strengthen ties with the Soviet Union throughout his 10-year appointment as prime 
minister.  At the time, Daud did not believe alignment with the Soviets would have any 
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major impact on Afghanistan’s sovereignty.  According to Sir Martin Ewans, “He [Daud] 
was by no means blind to the risk of Communist subversion, but, in his view, 
Communism had no appeal within Afghan society: both the traditional and educated 
classes had a stake in the existing social order, while the people at large, with their 
adherence to tribal, Islamic ways, were far removed from the proletariat that was the 
accepted vehicle of a communist revolution.”62  Diplomatic ties with the Soviets initiated 
by Daud would have lasting effects on Afghan society. 
Daud’s progressive agenda, along with Soviet influence, gave rise to a leftist 
movement, particularly in and around Kabul.  Sensing a disruption in the status quo, King 
Zahir requested and received Daud’s resignation.  Instead of turning to a new prime 
minister to lead the country, however, King Zahir took personal charge of the state in 
1963.  In an effort to head off revolutionary advances, Zahir sought to institute a more 
democratic style of government and, in 1964, signed a new constitution, which was then 
ratified by the Loya Jirga.63   
2. Constitutional Monarchy 
The 1964 constitution attempted to reduce the royal family’s role in day-to-day 
operations of the government.  It also sought to open the political process to public view, 
and define individual rights and liberties for ordinary Afghans.64  New freedoms 
established by the constitution included the formation of village government institutions 
led by popularly elected representatives, as well as the creation of political parties.  
According to Richard Newell in The Politics of Afghanistan, “The attempt to bring 
formal instruments of representation and democracy to the peasant and nomad was an 
entirely new and experimental facet of modern political change.”65  Although the King 
made efforts to modernize Afghan society through the introduction of a more democratic 
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constitution, little modernization actually occurred.  The new parliament engaged in 
numerous debates, but overall decision-making authority remained in the King’s hands.66 
During this period, King Zahir attempted to escalate “trickle down social reform,” 
though wherever the regime encouraged social reform and modernization in Kabul it did 
so without forcing it in the countryside.67  The effect of these efforts served to increase 
divides already felt between the elite of the capital city and rural villagers.  Two 
significant factors that served to deepen this schism were shifts in the role of women in 
society and state run education programs.  Villages continued to cling to traditional 
values.  Although the differences did not lead to outright resistance or violence, political 
stagnation and the “struggle of various social strata within the state apparatus, hastened 
the crisis of legitimacy of the state.”68 
While Afghanistan experimented with the new constitutional monarchy, another 
less obvious threat to the regime began to take root.  The strides made in education, to 
include opportunities in the Soviet Union and the United States, led to a rise in the 
number of students in Kabul.  Unfortunately, they outnumbered the jobs available upon 
graduation.  This disjuncture fostered different movements in and around the University 
of Kabul.  At the same time, under provisions provided by the new constitution, new 
political parties began to develop.  In 1965, communist Afghans, under indirect influence 
from the Soviet Union, established the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA).69  Nur Mohammed Taraki, one of the leaders of the new PDPA, was later 
alleged to have served as a Soviet KGB asset since 1951.70 
The Islamist movement also began to gain traction among students attending 
Kabul University.  Islamists opposed the regime’s liberalism, Pashtun nationalism, 
foreign influence in Afghanistan (whether from the Soviets or the West), and 
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communism.71 They called for a return to traditional Islamic society governed by strict 
interpretations of shari’a law.  The introduction of competing political parties in 
Afghanistan, made possible under the 1964 Constitution, helped sow the seeds for future 
destabilization. 
3. Return to Autocracy 
In July 1973, former Prime Minister Daud (King Zahir’s cousin) seized power in 
a military coup, which ended constitutional development in Afghanistan.72  Political 
discourse in Kabul and fears of anarchy precipitated Daud’s move.  Daud consolidated 
his power through a series of executions, arrests and imprisonment of former 
administration officials.  Sensing a shift in the political tide, Daud ignored the religious 
and tribal leaders, preferring to ally himself with the leftist elites in Kabul.73 Initially 
supported by the PDPA during his coup, Daud became concerned about the level of the 
PDPA’s and the country’s dependence on the Soviet Union.  In an effort to limit Soviet 
influence, Daud reduced the number of PDPA members in his administration and limited 
the number of Soviet advisors to the military.74   
As with most things Afghan, the PDPA at this time was not a unified 
organization.  There were two factions.  The first was the Khalq faction, led by Nur 
Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin; the second was the Parcham faction led by 
Babrak Karmal.75  The two factions differed in their method of reform.  The Khalaq 
faction supported revolutionary reform in order to establish a socialist state, while the 
Parcham faction preferred a more gradual approach to socialism.76  Ironically, Daud’s 
decision to exclude the PDPA from his administration led to unification of the PDPA in 
1977. 
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4. Communism 
In 1978 Afghan Army units, backed by the PDPA, launched a military coup.  In 
the process, the presidential palace was surrounded and Daud was assassinated.77  The 
military leaders responsible for the coup turned authority over to Nur Mohammed Taraki, 
former leader of the Khalq faction of the PDPA.78  Following the coup, in late 1978, the 
PDPA introduced sweeping reforms to solidify its position.  The new administration 
changed the Afghan flag from traditional Islamic green to communist red.  In addition, 
the administration announced a plan to reform Afghan society that included land reform 
as well as equal rights and education for women.79  Oliver Roy describes the 
implementation of these new reforms: 
To achieve this they [the communist regime] adopted three means: 
repression, made possible by the existence of a loyal and well-equipped 
army; agrarian reform which, they thought, would win the support of the 
mass of people; and the elimination of illiteracy, in order to rescue the 
people from the influence of the clergy [Islamic] and to spread the new 
ideology.80 
In response to the planned reforms, rural Afghan society revolted.  The new 
government responded to the uprisings with brute force.  Mass executions, arrests, and 
imprisonments led to widespread desertions in the Afghan Army.  As Larry Goodson 
comments in Afghanistan’s Endless War, the mass uprisings “should have led the 
government to slow the pace of reform and attempt to win popular support.”81  Instead, 
Hafizullah Amin seized control of the government from Taraki and continued the 
widespread repression.  As the situation became increasingly unstable, the Soviet Union 
attempted to support the fledgling communist regime with additional advisors and 
equipment. 
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Displeased with Amin’s efforts to quell the rebellion following his ambitious 
removal of Taraki, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979.  Seeking a 
more amiable leader the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, former leader of the Parcham 
faction of the PDPA, as the new Afghan President.  Repressive tactics, including 
executions, destruction of entire villages, mass arrests, and massive displacement of 
civilians continued throughout the ten year long Soviet occupation.  Soviet efforts to 
counter the resistance and bring governance to Afghanistan failed.  In 1986 the Soviets 
replaced President Karmal with Mohammed Najibullah.  In 1989, the Soviets withdrew 
from Afghanistan, leaving President Najibullah’s communist regime clinging to power. 
5. Theocracy: The Taliban 
Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 through 1992, the Mujahedin resistance 
movement continued to fight the Najibullah regime.  As Soviet forces withdrew, and the 
United States lost interest in Afghanistan, President Najibullah’s communist government 
struggled to maintain control.  Without the support of the Soviet Army, Najibullah lacked 
the power to defeat the anti-Soviet Mujahedin.  However, instead of a waging a 
coordinated campaign, the Mujahedin fractured as pre-Soviet ethnic and political 
differences resurfaced.82  Seth Jones describes the disintegration of the Mujahedin: 
Since Afghan state [communist] authority was too weak to provide order 
and deliver services, the objectives of opposition groups [Mujahedin] 
came to resemble those of competitive state builders.  Each Mujahedin 
leader aspired to build an army and a financial apparatus capable of 
supporting it.  Rival ethnic and political interests splintered the anti-Soviet 
Mujahedin coalition into competing factions, and fighting soon broke 
out.83 
In a bid for power and positioning in the future government of Afghanistan, the 
Mujahedin splintered into competing factions. 
Faced with dwindling Soviet support and unable to defeat the Mujahedin, 
President Najibullah agreed to a UN brokered peace proposal.  The proposal called for 
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the establishment of an interim government that would assume all authority from the 
Najibullah regime.  However, the transition to this new authority was anything but 
smooth. 
Competing factions within the resistance all laid claim to positions in the new 
government.  Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the northern resistance, and Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, leader of the resistance in the south, halted on the outskirts of Kabul while 
resistance leaders in Peshawar attempted to determine the composition of the interim 
government.84  Growing impatient, Masoud and Hekmatyar entered the city.  Their 
factions engaged in heavy fighting over control of Kabul.  In the end, representatives 
from the Islamic Jihad Council (Peshawar) arrived to receive the Najibullah regime’s 
surrender. 
The interim government, established by the Islamic Jihad Council (IJC) and led 
by Sibghatullah Mujadiddi, appointed Massoud as the Minister of Defense and Hekmatyr 
as the Prime Minister.  However, Hekmatyr refused to serve so long as Massoud held a 
position in the government.85  In accordance with the IJC’s guidance, Mujadiddi 
transferred authority to Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-e Islami political 
party.86 
Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, closely aligned himself with Massoud and the former 
northern resistance movement.  Rabbani’s presidency marked only the second time in 
Afghanistan’s history that a non-ethnic Pashtun held the reigns of power in Kabul.  
Conflict and dissension grew over the composition of Rabbani’s administration.  
Pashtuns rejected leadership by Tajiks and Uzbeks.  The fledgling government spiraled 
out of control and inter-ethnic fighting broke out.  According to Seth Jones, “Afghan 
commanders controlled fiefdoms, and each was supported by a neighboring country, such 
as Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and India.”87 
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Amidst the anarchy of civil war, the Afghan people suffered terribly.  Governance 
was non-existent.  Lawlessness ensued.  “Individual commanders abused the population 
at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for sexual pleasure, robbing merchants in the 
bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets.”88 It is alleged that in one such instance, 
when a local warlord raped several girls, the people of the village turned to Mullah 
Mohammed Omar for justice.  Mullah Omar organized a group of his religious students 
to track down and execute the offender.89  As the eventual leader of the Taliban, Mullah 
Omar stated after the incident, “We were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong.  
How could we remain quiet when we could see crimes being committed against women 
and the poor?”90  Mullah Omar appeared able to provide order and justice.  Thus, the 
Taliban movement arose. 
Like Mullah Omar, former Mujahidin fighters who attended madrassas in post-
Soviet Afghanistan found themselves disgusted by the rampant factionalism, lawlessness, 
and anarchy.  They began to plan for the return of order to Afghan society.  The group’s 
goals were simple in nature: restore peace, disarm the population, enforce shari’a law, 
and defend the Islamic character of Afghanistan.91 
Never seeking personal aggrandizement, Omar and the Taliban’s desire to create a 
just, Islamic system in Afghanistan resonated with many members of the war-torn 
Afghan society.  As the movement grew, Rabbani’s government in Kabul sought Taliban 
support as Hekmatyr attempted to wrest control of Kabul.  Although Hekmatyr’s militia 
was predominantly Pashtun, the Taliban regarded it as a contributing factor to the 
country’s lawlessness, and attacked it. 
As the Taliban proved able to win on the battlefield, neighboring countries began 
to take notice.  Iran, concerned for the Shia minority in Afghanistan, backed the Shia-
dominated Northern Alliance.  Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance stemmed from its 
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perception that the Taliban would repress the Shia minority in Afghanistan.  Pakistan, 
desperate to maintain influence over Afghanistan, backed the Sunni Pashtun-dominated 
Taliban instead. 
By 1998, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan; Massoud was the lone 
holdout.92 In areas it controlled, the Taliban disarmed the population, enforced law and 
order, and opened roads to traffic, which resulted in an immediate drop in food prices.93 
Afghans guilty of criminal offenses were immediately and viciously dealt with.  
Executions were commonplace.  The Taliban outlawed television, as well as other 
recreational activities, and forbade women from working outside the home or going to 
school.  Although extremely repressive in nature, “There was no doubt that many 
Afghans did sincerely welcome the Taliban as providers of security.”94 
The Taliban regime’s contribution to Afghan stability was control and order 
through fear. In terms of actual governance or administration, it made no attempt to 
“mobilize resources systematically,” or provide essential services.95  The Taliban saw 
urban areas as “cities of sin, to be ruled with a strong hand.”96  Rural areas were 
considered less of threat, and typically life was allowed to continue much as it always 
had. 
As the Taliban attempted to consolidate control over the entire country, it 
received monetary and logistical support from interested donor nations, most notably 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.97  In addition to external state 
support, the Taliban received financial support from Osama bin Laden in exchange for 
his ability to run terror training camps, formerly operated by Pakistani ISI for the training 
of Kashmiri insurgents.98  Utilizing former Mujahedin Arabs who had stayed in Pakistan 
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and Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden established the al Qaeda terror 
network.  The hijackers responsible for attacks on the United States trained in these 
camps. 
In response to the Taliban’s support of Al Qaeda, the United States and the 
Northern Alliance waged a campaign against the Taliban regime from October—January 
2001.  Ultimately, the Taliban government was ousted, and the United States began a ten-
year log effort to establish order in Afghanistan. 
6. Establishing Political Order 
After defeating the Taliban, Kabul was once again occupied by a non-Pashtun 
force, this time the Northern Alliance.  If stability was to be achieved, the United States-
led coalition realized it needed to act quickly to avert further ethnic conflict between the 
Pashtuns and the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. 
It was under this pressure that the United States turned to Lakhdar Brahimi, the 
United Nations Secretary General’s personal representative, for assistance.99  The United 
States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, appointed Ambassador James Dobbins to serve as 
a special envoy to the Afghan opposition.  Brahimi and Dobbins became the primary 
architects of probably the most difficult diplomatic venture in recent history, the crafting 
of a new Afghan government.  The prospects for peace and stability hinged on 
establishing a government that would both satisfy international actors as well as Afghan 
leaders and the Afghan people.  The complexity of this venture cannot be overstated.  Sir 
Martin Ewans describes the difficulties Bahimi and Dobbins would face: 
[Any settlement regarding governance in Afghanistan] will have to 
accommodate the international communities requirement to end the threats 
that Afghanistan poses in terms of regional instability, drugs and 
terrorism, while accounting for the Afghans’ ingrained intolerance of any 
interference in their affairs.  It is entirely possible that such an 
accommodation may not be achievable.100 
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Brahimi and Dobbins worked closely to organize a UN sponsored conference held 
in Germany, known as the Bonn Conference, in order to form the next Afghan 
government.101  Both men agreed that the conference should include representatives from 
all factions of the Afghan opposition.  Among potential participants in the new Afghan 
government were four main groups.  The two primary groups were 1) the Tajik, Uzbek, 
and Shia-dominated Northern Alliance; and 2) supporters of the former King, Zahir Shah.  
Secondary groups included a delegation of émigré leaders who resided in Pakistan 
(Peshawar Group) and opposition leaders with links to Iran, who Brahimi and Dobbins 
called the “Cyprus Group” based on meetings held there.102  Significant absentees from 
the conference included: the former King, Zahir Shah; the former President, Rabbani; 
resistance leader Hamid Karzai; and the powerful warlord Abdul Rashid Dostam.103  
Ultimately, each of the absentees would play a significant role in Afghanistan’s transition 
to a new government, but it is difficult to say what, if any, effect their presence would 
have had on the conference. 
While organizing the conference, Brahimi and Dobbins disagreed on one 
particular point.  Dobbins felt that all neighboring powers should participate in the 
conference.  Brahimi was opposed to the inclusion of outside players.  Dobbins’ 
reasoning centered on the tremendous influence neighboring states had exercised over 
Afghanistan during the previous 20 years.  He felt that, without their participation and 
buy-in, the new Afghan government would be susceptible to subversion or undermining 
by them.  Brahimi, on the other hand, believed non-Afghan participation would affect the 
perceived legitimacy of the Afghan government.  In his view, isolation would enable the 
participants to arrive at a purely Afghan solution.  In the end, the two diplomats reached a 
compromise: all powers would be invited to the conference and allowed access to the 
Afghan delegation but would not be permitted to attend private sessions held among the 
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Afghan opposition groups.104  The only non-Afghan in the actual meetings would be 
Brahimi, in order to moderate and ensure discussions progressed smoothly. 
The conference was held from 27 November through 5 December 2001.  It is not 
clear whether careful consideration was given to these dates, but as the Afghans arrived 
to undertake the arduous task of constructing a new government it became clear that 
someone should have checked these dates against the Islamic calendar.  The conference 
fell during the holy month of Ramadan.105  In keeping with their faith, the Afghan 
delegates fasted during the day and only ate after evening prayers.  So, as the delegates 
began hours of intense deliberations, they did so on empty stomachs. 
As the conference progressed, envoys from the “six plus two “ forum, comprising 
representatives from the six states bordering Afghanistan (Iran, China, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan), plus Russia and the United States, met with the 
Afghan opposition members during breaks in the negotiations.106  As Ambassador 
Dobbins puts it, “The essentially Afghan nature of the negotiations was preserved, and at 
the same time the interested governments had an opportunity to influence the results.”107  
In reality, the Afghans never had an opportunity to exercise self-determination.  Instead, 
Brahimi presented them with a draft interim constitution for consideration.  According to 
Dobbins, “Brahimi took the lead in moving the Afghans toward our [international 
community] desired goals.”108   
Midway through the conference, a copy of the draft interim constitution circulated 
among the international envoys.  In reviewing the document, international representatives 
noted that there was no mention of democracy or terrorism.  In astonishment, one 
international delegate said, “The text makes no mention of democratic election; 
furthermore, the draft makes no mention of terrorism.  Should we not insist that the new 
Afghan regime be committed to cooperate with the international community to combat 
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terrorism?”109  Exercising diplomatic pressure, the international envoys were able to 
influence the contents of the interim constitution.  Specifically, the international 
community ensured the Afghan delegation included democracy and human rights clauses 
in the final draft. 
At the conclusion of the conference, the international community congratulated 
itself on the Afghans finally reaching an agreement.  The Afghan government would 
initially have an interim administration, followed by a transitional government 
responsible for drafting an official constitution, after which point the country would hold 
national elections.   
It is not clear exactly how much of this plan was derived by the Afghans 
themselves, or to what degree they actually intended to pledge it their full support.  What 
is clear is that the international community exercised significant influence over the 
process, with the roadmap for stabilizing Afghanistan created in only seven days of 
meetings.  The precedent for continued international interference in Afghan affairs was 
thus set.  In the coming years, the Afghan leadership would continue to find itself pushed 
and pulled between the desires of the international community and those of its own 
people.  Perhaps not surprisingly, in the nine years since the Bonn conference, 
governance in and over Afghanistan remains elusive.  A resurgent Taliban, ongoing 
corruption, slow development of the security forces, and political stagnation all continue 
to plague Afghan society. 
B. ANALYSIS 
Monarchy, autocracy, constitutional monarchy, communism, theocracy, and, most 
recently, non-secular democracy all represent systems of governance.  At the heart of 
each system lies the answer to one fundamental question: who will establish the rules that 
will create order for society?  Or, stated more clearly, what system of governance will 
provide enough social control to foster stability?  Of course, the answers to these 
questions only raise more questions.  Since, after all, according to William Maley, 
“Stabilizing a post-intervention situation is not narrowly technical: it invariably raises 
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fundamental questions of political philosophy.  Is a strong state preferable to a weak 
state?  Should political power be concentrated or divided? Should state power be 
dispersed through local government with a federal system, or should there be regional 
autonomy?”110  
As we have seen, Ammanullah, Daud, Taraki, and Najibullah all suffered the 
same fate as a result of their attempts to “employ state power to change Afghan society 
without the cooperation of their people.”111  Each of these leaders attempted, in various 
ways, to socially and economically supplant traditional power structures with institutions 
created by the central government.  Conversely, Nadir and Zahir Shah limited 
government intrusion into the lives of Afghans, except in cases of security and for the 
purposes of raising revenue.  Instead of replacing existing traditional power structures at 
the village level, or utilizing government power structures to forcefully implement 
reforms, Nadir and Zahir Shah aimed to incorporate the traditional power structures “in 
order to prevent them from causing trouble.”112  In effect, relations between the regime 
and the people consisted mainly of local power brokers monitoring village politics for 
hints of any internal threat.  Even the Taliban respected the autonomous nature of rural 
Afghan society. 
1. The Current Problem: Environment of Competition 
In contrast to Nadir and Zahir’s approach, current efforts to govern Afghan 
society rely heavily on a framework influenced by liberalism and modernization 
theory.113  The widely held presumption is that liberal institutions established at the 
national level will eventually transform Afghan society into a stable society.  Stability 
and reconstruction have become synonymous with modernization and progress in 
development.114  Yet, as seen throughout Afghanistan’s history, progress or 
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modernization that is thrust upon the Afghan people only serves to foster resistance.   
Thus, one has to wonder: could there be some other way to achieve stability apart from 
modernization?  Could the international community accept stable societies that might 
never modernize?  Arguably, modernization and progress require a stable environment: 
Perhaps that has to be achieved first.  Alternatively, Afghanistan’s own history strongly 
suggests that the Afghan people have to be willing to accept changes, as well as those 
introducing the changes, or they are more likely to resist both those changes and the 
agents of change. 
Right now, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) is 
caught between pressures exerted by the international community and the nature of 
Afghan society.  The resurgence of the Taliban signals disillusionment with the 
government.  The combination of a lack of security, a lack of justice, and corruption 
prevalent throughout the country has led villagers to a crossroads.  From the villager’s 
perspective, the fundamental question is: which form of governance, and which side, do I 
identify with more closely?  Should I support a corrupt centralized non-secular 
democracy that is championed by a secular invading force?  Or, do I throw in with the 
ruthlessly oppressive Taliban? 
2. Ideological Resonance 
Afghanistan is structured along tribal and ethnic lines.  Traditionally, the tribal 
elders, warlords, and/or religious authorities have set the rules that guide Afghan social 
behavior.115  Joel Migdal refers to such informal leaders as “strongmen.”116  In 
Afghanistan, the strongmen maintain the power to “make and implement the binding 
rules for the society.”117  The current government in Kabul challenges this historical 
norm.  Because President Karzai retains the power to appoint provincial and district 
governors as representatives of the state, the provincial governors and district governors 
represent the state’s interests to the people, as opposed to representing the people’s 
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interests to the state.118  In this way, the Afghan state is actually in competition with local 
ethnic, tribal, and religious groups that all have different and competing policies 
regarding how social life should be ordered.119  Compounding this problem are social 
reforms pushed by the government and supported by the international community.  In 
more conservative areas of Afghanistan, for instance, girls’ education has become a 
significant point of contention.  Afghans view policies focused on social restructuring as 
a threat to their way of life.  This dynamic perpetuates resistance to the central 
government. 
3. Social Contract: Expectations 
As part of the social contract, members of a society have certain expectations 
regarding the functions of the state.  Prior to the United States invasion, the political and 
social order in Afghanistan was rigidly controlled and enforced by the Taliban.  Law, 
order, and justice were carried out ruthlessly.  There was an order⎯a set of rules that all 
Afghans knew.  The Afghan villager may well have hated the Taliban’s methods and 
policies, but his knowledge of the rules allowed for a degree of security and predictability 
on a day to day basis.   
In terms of the social contract, Afghan society benefited from Taliban rule in that 
the Taliban provided order.  As part of the social contract, society’s responsibility was 
mainly obedience in exchange for the order the Taliban provided.  Swift justice for 
offenses committed against society, along with security writ more broadly, are the 
primary expectations held by Afghan citizens.  If the government is unable, or unwilling, 
to punish criminals, there is no security.  The external pressure on the Afghan state by the 
international community to adopt western versions of the rule of law, human rights, and 
democratic rule fosters a series of disconnects between the Afghan state and Afghan 
society.  Here, it is worth bearing in mind that the Afghan government’s dependence on 
the international community for security and aid drives policymaking. 
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For example, in November 2008, President Karzai signed the execution order for 
nine convicted criminals.120  The President’s decision to sign the execution order was in 
response to pleas from Afghan citizens for justice.121  Immediately following the public 
hangings, the international community condemned the action as inhumane.  In response 
to the international outcry, an Afghan administrative official explained, “The President 
has been thinking for some time how to reduce the death penalty in these cases to life in 
prison.  But he couldn't find a way. So he has signed the execution orders.”122   
The August 2010 stoning of two Afghans by their fellow villagers in Kunduz 
province serves to further highlight the discrepancy between state and society in 
Afghanistan.  According to eyewitness accounts, two villagers were found guilty of 
adultery by a village mullah, and sentenced to death by stoning.123  Members of the 
village carried out the sentence and stoned the man and woman to death.  Reports 
indicate that family members of the accused and over 200 villagers participated in the 
executions.124  In this case, the Mullah exercised traditional authority in administering 
justice.  Yet, the Afghan government condemned the action, since the Afghan 
constitution also champions human rights and the rule of law. 
Both these instances illustrate how the current Afghan government is not meeting 
the people’s expectations for justice.  Attempts to conform to the international 
community’s standards for dispensing justice have instead created a perception within 
Afghan society that the state is unjust. Herein lies a major problem: the central  
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governments’ perception of justice is not in synch with the population’s expectations.  
The state is therefore failing to uphold its end of the social contract, at least as far as 
many Afghans are concerned. 
4. Comfort and Familiarity 
As outlined in Chapter II, comfort and familiarity center on the systems and 
processes the government uses to distribute services.  The current processes used by 
Kabul to legislate, apply the rule of law, and provide justice are unfamiliar to Afghans.  
The Afghan constitution attempts to balance traditional Islamic law with typical western 
ideals of individual freedom.  Essentially, Afghanistan’s legal system is a hybrid mix 
between Islamic law and man made state legislation.  For much of Afghan society, 
Shari’a, or Islamic law, is the basis for social order.  In theory, the current constitution 
takes this into account.  According to Chapter One, Article Three of the Afghan 
Constitution, “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the 
sacred religion of Islam.”125  One problem is, however, there are numerous, often 
conflicting interpretations of Shari’a.  Compounding this is the method by which law has 
been traditionally applied in Afghanistan. 
Historically, establishing social order in Afghanistan has been an informal affair.  
Formal state institutions have played a limited role, particularly in rural Afghanistan, 
when it comes to applying law or dispensing justice.  In rural Afghan society, conflict 
resolution and collective decision making regarding everyday matters fall to the jirga or 
shura.  The term jirga “refers to a local/tribal institution of decision making and dispute 
settlement that incorporates the prevalent local customary law, institutionalized rituals, 
and a body of village elders whose collective decision about the resolution of a dispute is 
binding on the parties involved.”126  Given the various interpretations of Islamic law and 
variances in local customary law, establishing state institutions for the purpose of 
applying universal law is extremely problematic. 
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According to Chapter One, Article Six of the Afghan constitution: 
The state is obliged to create a prosperous and progressive society based 
on social justice, protection of human dignity, protection of human rights, 
realization of  democracy, and to ensure national unity and equality 
among all ethnic groups and tribes and to provide for balanced 
development in all areas of the country.127 
Again, state institutions created to implement and uphold the principles 
articulated in the constitution find themselves at odds with the traditional decision 
making authorities.  As an example of the difficulties this creates, consider: if the 
interpretation of Shari’a by the jirga in a given Afghan village dictates that women will 
not attend school, then that jirga is in violation of Afghan law according to equality 
clauses in the constitution.  Similarly, in the case of murder, the jirga may invoke the 
customary law of badal (direct vengeance) to settle the dispute.128  But, the sanctioned 
murder of an individual for offenses committed against another individual is, again, at 
odds with established state law.   
According to Ali Wardak, the main reason Afghans prefer the jirga as a source of 
resolution is because the jirga is “conducted by respected elders with established social 
status and a reputation for piety and fairness.”129  As Wardak goes on to write, “elders 
reach decisions in accordance with accepted local traditions/values (customary law) that 
are deeply ingrained in the collective conscience of the village/tribe.”130  In essence, 
Afghans are most comfortable and familiar with the traditional process of dispute 
resolution via the jirga.  The idea of state-administered due process or state imposed law 
is largely unfamiliar.  The government’s attempts to exert authority via legislation, the 
application of its laws, and its methods of administering justice thus create tensions 
between traditional governing structures and the state.  This tension results in a social 
misfit for Afghan society.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
In other words, the Afghan government is attempting to make and enforce rules 
for a society that do not resonate for those it intends to govern.  As Professor Paul 
Collier, of Oxford University, writes, “The fundamental mistake of our approach to state 
building has been to forget that well functioning states are built not just on shared 
interests, but on shared identity.”131  In a well functioning state, the government typically 
reflects the ideals and values held in society; the society can therefore identify with its 
governing body.  In Afghanistan, the society struggles to identify with the centralized 
government.  Of course, some of the oppressive measures and methods imposed by local 
authorities in Afghanistan are, by the standards of Western countries, morally 
reprehensible, and possibly even evil.  There is no question that stonings, hangings, 
amputations, and public executions run counter to the idea of human dignity as 
established by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.132  However, 
the issue of whether a society has the right to govern itself must be addressed, since if it 
does have that right, then does it not also have the right to define the ways in which it 
establishes social order and control? 
In the next section, we will examine social fit in a stable society, void of violence, 
but plagued by political stagnation.  While Bosnia remains under the defacto rule of the 
international community, its prospects of self-governance drift further out of its grasp. 
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IV. POLITICAL STAGNATION AND SOCIAL FIT: BOSNIA 
We are bound to admit that the elements and traits that belong to a state 
must also exist in the individuals that compose the state.133 
Socrates, The Republic by Plato 375 BC 
Similar to Afghanistan’s plight as a battleground between regional state actors 
domestic Afghan factions, Bosnia also suffered through civil war brought on by 
competing players.134   However, at least in the Bosnia case, the design of the transitional 
government, as well as the introduction of U.S. peacekeepers, was agreed to by the 
warring parties prior to implementation.  Understandably, negotiating the peace and 
ending hostilities are frequently given the most consideration in conflict-ridden 
situations.  Addressing the grievances that led to the conflict in order to avoid a country 
slipping back into war requires a delicate balancing act.  Nowhere has this proven more 
true than in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  For the last 15 years, United Nations efforts in Bosnia 
have yielded mixed results.  Members of the United Nations and the international 
community at large often refer to Bosnia as a great success; however, the Bosnian path to 
self- governance remains far from clear.  
The resources provided to war torn Bosnia have far exceeded support given to any 
other post-conflict country.135  Fifteen years after the signing of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia—Herzegovina (GFAP), otherwise known as the Dayton 
Peace Accords, the future stability of Bosnia remains in question.  The wartime 
concessions made in the name of peace in 1995 rightly focused first and foremost on 
ending the violence.  However, the complex federal structure and the special powers 
given to the United Nations High Representative (OHR) have left Bosnia in a state of 
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political stagnation, with little hope of reform.136  The disintegration of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the resulting brutal ethnic civil war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the ensuing international intervention shed light on the capabilities and 
limitations of the international community’s ability to establish governance that fits the 
society to be governed. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Bosnia and the greater Yugoslavia have a long history of ethnic conflict followed 
by periods of relative stability.  The current conflict, as with all Balkan conflicts, resulted 
from the heterogeneous nature of Balkan society.  Religious differences and nationalism 
have served as the precursors to vicious atrocities and instability in the region.137  The 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six semiautonomous 
republics up until its disintegration in 1991.  The six republics included: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia.  Within each 
republic pockets of three distinct ethnicities and their corresponding religions existed; 
Muslim Bosniacs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Christian Serbs. 
Up until 1980, Josip Broz Tito, a communist former partisan resistance leader 
who fought against the German occupation during World War II, governed 
Yugoslavia.138  Tito maintained stability and power through a “system of political 
musical chairs” in which political leadership rotated every few years to prevent any 
single leader from acquiring strength.139  Tito’s death in 1980 sparked a political power 
vacuum in Yugoslavia.  While he lived, Tito failed to establish any political legacy to 
govern.  With no authoritarian leader to guide the country, Yugoslavia fell into political 
stagnation, which gave rise to a return to ethnic nationalism. 
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In 1991, the increasing ethnic tensions led to war between Croats, Serbs and 
Bosniacs.  In response to the growing violence, Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence from Yugoslavia.  Bosnia found itself at the center of a power struggle 
between Croatia and Serbia.  Both Croatia and Serbia each claimed territorial rights and 
responsibilities for their respective co-ethnics in Bosnia.  Nationalism, inspired by leaders 
seeking political power, and the revived memory of past atrocities perpetuated against 
each other, led to numerous incidents of ethnic cleansing and genocide from 1992 
through 1995.140  
The United Nations first deployed peacekeepers to the region in 1992 in an effort 
to provide humanitarian relief and protection for minorities in Croatia and Bosnia.141  
However, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) proved ineffective at 
halting the violence due to ambiguous guidance, a lack of clear goals, and differing levels 
of support from each military’s parent nation.142  In 1995, following three years of the 
worst atrocities seen in Europe since the end of World War II, the warring parties 
succumbed to international pressure and agreed to peace talks brokered by the United 
States, Germany, France, Britain, and Russia.143 
In November 1995, all parties gathered in Dayton, Ohio to outline what would 
became known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(GFAP).  Similar to the negotiations that paved the way for governance in Afghanistan, 
diplomatic pressure would influence the outcome of the peace talks.  Ambassador James 
Dobbins describes the complexities inherent in the civil administration of Bosnia: 
While the ethnic groups often coexisted peacefully under Turkish, 
Austrian, or communist rule, Bosnia was subject to external or strong 
internal authority under these governments.  Although nationalist leaders 
distorted and exploited ethnic grudges before and during the recent 
conflict, these grudges did have a basis in history and, when paired with 
                                                 
140 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War & the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (Penguin (Non-
Classics), 2001), 638.  
141 “UNPROFOR,” n.d., http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprofor.htm. 
142 Glenny, The Balkans, 642. 
143 Ibid., 647. 
 46
three years of bitter civil war, posed a significant challenge to prospects 
for reconciliation between the former warring parties.144  
Fervent nationalism, coupled with the emotional outrage over extreme atrocities, 
were significant impediments to reaching any agreements during the negotiations.  
Recognizing this fact, Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, 
forced all sides to come to an agreement.  According to Misha Glenny: 
The Assistant Secretary of State for Europe was brutal and blunt whenever 
necessary – cajoling, heckling, and insisting.  He had to threaten all three 
sides – the Serbs with more bombing, and the maintenance of sanctions; 
the Moslems with the limits of American support (it is your right to 
continue the war,’ he told Alija Izetbegovic [Bosniac President] at one 
point, ‘but don’t expect the United States to provide your air force.’); and 
the Croats with a withdrawal of American diplomatic sympathy – one 
phone call from President Clinton to Franjo Tudman [Croat President], 
just as it seemed that Dayton was collapsing proved sufficient to save the 
talks.145 
While Holbrooke’s actions resulted in garnering peace, concessions made in the 
development of the post-conflict government did little to pave the way for future stability.  
“The documents from Dayton are incredibly complex, leaving room for both partition 
and some form of a united state.”146  In effect, the agreement paved the way for 
continued political instability rather than stability.  Compounding the ambiguous nature 
of the agreement itself, the signers of the document called into question its legitimacy.  
Immediately following the negotiations, “the Serbs and Croats argued that they did not 
sign the agreement, and the Bosniacs contended that they were coerced into it.  Thus, 
each party was aggrieved even before the implementation process began.”147 
B. ANALYSIS 
Although the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords and the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops brought an end to violence, underlying ethnic tensions and the desire 
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for ethnically homogenous entities still exist among the three factions that make up 
Bosnia.  The complexity of the political organization in Bosnia has resulted in a political 
stalemate, wherein each ethnic party blocks, stalls, or obstructs progress on issues of 
extreme importance.148  Attempting to avoid political stagnation, the international 
community had to step in again. 
In 1997, the United Nation’s Office of the High Representative (OHR) was given 
the power to approve or disapprove public appointments in Bosnia, impose legislation, 
and remove public officials deemed obstructionists to progress.149  These powers became 
known as the “Bonn Powers.”150  Francis Fukuyama describes the lasting effects of the 
Bonn powers on Bosnian society: 
The country continues to be governed by the United Nations Office of the 
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR).  There is no 
meaningful democracy in Bosnia, despite the holding of elections; the 
OHR uses its powers to dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, 
mayors, and other elected officials.  It (OHR) passes legislation and 
creates new institutions without reference to the preferences of the 
Bosnian people.  Much of the administrative capacity of the Bosnian 
government lay in the hands of international experts rather than 
indigenous civil servants.151  
Essentially, the High Representative functions as the supreme leader of Bosnia, 
with the power to hire and fire elected representatives at will, strike down law enacted 
democratically by the Bosnian people, and remove democratically elected 
representatives.  Currently, whatever stability maintained in Bosnia is a direct result of 
the special powers given to the OHR.  According to the GFAP, the Bosnian Federal 
Government maintains the authority to establish a national banking system, national 
currency, national flag, identification cards, and automobile registration.  However, all of 
                                                 
148 Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding In Postconflict Societies: Strategy And Process (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005), 103. 
149 “An Agenda For Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Last High Representitive” (Center for European 
Integration Strategies, January 26, 2006), 2, http://www.ceis-
eu.org/publications/policy_briefs/2006/doc/02_2006_ceis_policy_brief.pdf. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Profile 
Books Ltd, 2005), 103. 
 48
these accomplishments and agreements occurred as a result of the OHR’s powers to 
legislate unilaterally.  In many ways, any progress at all has been a result of the OHR’s 
actions. 
Yet, the international community cannot administer a state forever.  Considering 
the components of social fit should help to identify ways in which Bosnian society may 
ultimately establish self-rule. 
1. Ideological Resonance: Nationalism 
If we examine the current Bosnian state through the eyes of an individual Bosnian 
who has lived through ruthless conflict, his dilemma is clear.  To a Bosnian Serb the 
current national government represents a conglomeration of his former enemies.  He will 
likely resist a policy established by the government simply because it was decided by his 
former enemies.  He will not see the government as his government.  As long as the 
Bosnian government does not reflect Serb values, the Bosnian Serbs will be unlikely to 
accept it.  The same goes for Bosniacs and Croats.  Consequently, all anyone can expect 
is continued political stagnation and the required supervision by international entities. 
As recently as 2009, the tenuous peace has shown signs of deteriorating.  In May, 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, published a list of 68 
powers that the Bosnian state “has stolen from Bosnian Serbs” living in the Bosnian 
Republic of Srpska.152  The elected representatives of the Serb-dominated parliament 
listed powers such as control of the judiciary, the power to collect customs and duties, 
manage foreign trade, and deploy the police.153  The Republic of Srpska national 
assembly then voted on a resolution to have these powers returned to it.  In effect, the 
assembly passed a law declaring that these powers belonged to it rather than the Bosnian 
State.  In response to these events, the current High Representative, Mr. Valentin Inzko, 
invoked the special “Bonn powers” to rescind this legislation.154 
                                                 
152 Dan Bilefsky, “Bosnia Serbs and Envoy Are at Odds on Powers,” The New York Times, June 20, 
2009, sec. International / Europe, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/europe/20bosnia.html. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Dan Bilefsky, “Bosnia Serbs and Envoy Are at Odds on Powers,” The New York Times, June 20, 
2009, sec. International / Europe, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/europe/20bosnia.html. 
 49
Not only does this reveal political schisms in Bosnian society, but also as long as 
the United Nations Office of the High Representative possesses the power to veto laws 
enacted through democratic processes, the ethnicities that make up Bosnia will never 
achieve collective self-government.  At the same time, while Bosnia might remain intact 
and stable, the international community will be unable to withdraw.   
As stated in Chapter II, when the values of the people are reflected, understood, 
and shared by the governing authority, the government will ideologically resonate with 
members of society.  When this occurs, members of society and the government will have 
achieved social fit.  Identifying the values held by members of society can help identify 
what values the government should represent. 
The values that resonate among the different factions in Bosnia are nationalistic 
and, to a lesser extent, religious.  The Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs each value their ethnic 
identity and each seeks to be represented by those who share their ethnic and religious 
identity.  It is tempting to say these differences can be overcome, and equality, peace, and 
cooperation will result; however, members of Bosnian society are the sole judges of this 
possibility.  Or as one of Bosnia’s three presidents, Haris Silajdzic, said in a Public 
Broadcasting exclusive aired in 2009, “We do have political tensions and that is because 
of two divergent concepts.  The one is a multicultural country and the other a divided 
ethnic country.”155  According to Srecko Latal, a writer for the Balkan Investigative 
reporting network (also commenting in 2009), “Bosnia-Herzegovina right now is facing 
the most difficult crisis since the end of its war. We have come into the situation where 
local leaders don't want to make it work.  I mean, they deliberately block the work of 
joint state and entity institutions. And, as a result, we are facing a major deadlock on 
almost a complete level.”156  
Resistance to joint institutions and refusal to cooperate with former enemies 
clearly illustrate what matters to Bosnians.  The current United Nations effort to force  
 
                                                 




reconciliation and cooperation is out of synch with what people in Bosnia want.  
Nationalism, and the right to be governed by members of one’s own ethnicity, clearly still 
resonates with most Bosnians. 
2. Social Contract: Expectations 
Bosnia, unlike Afghanistan, has limited security concerns.  For the most part, 
peace and security exist.  However, determining what, if any, expectations Bosnians have 
of government are difficult.  Growing apathy and disenchantment with the political 
process perpetuate the current political stagnation.  In Bosnia, there is an “extremely low 
level of regard of politicians and the political process itself.”157  Some scholars view the 
level of apathy as a byproduct of Bosnia’s socialist authoritarian past.  But surely the 
absence of policy that effectively maintains, or improves, the standard of living 
contributes to this political apathy. 
The latest figures indicate that the current unemployment rate in Bosnia is over 40 
percent.158  However, the unemployment data does not reflect the realities on the ground.  
Most Bosnians have resorted to pursuing “survival strategies outside of the formal 
economy, from subsistence agriculture to black market trade, they do not contribute to 
public revenues and receive little in the way of public services.”159  Clearly, economic 
stagnation feeds further disinterest in the state. 
In fact, it appears that Bosnians have learned to accept the declining standards of 
living brought on by weak economic policy.  A lack of confidence in current state 
institutions, and mistrust of all things political, has resulted in lowered expectations.  In a 
2009 sample poll, 83 percent of Bosnians surveyed responded “none,” when asked “What 
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political party do you think is best able to solve economic issues?”160  Given responses 
like this, evaluating social fit according to expectations is difficult.   
3. Comfort and Familiarity 
Bosnia’s political arrangement outlined in the 1995 peace agreement includes a 
three-member collective presidency, in which each ethnicity maintains representation at 
the federal level.161  Currently, the bicameral Parliamentary Assembly is evenly 
distributed with five Croats, five Bosniacs, and five Serbs serving as representatives.162  
The Bosnian state is then further divided into two semiautonomous entities, primarily 
along ethnic lines, the Bosniac–Croat Federation and the Republic of Srpska.163  The 
House of Representatives consists of 28 members representing the Bosniac-Croat 
Federation and 14 members representing the Republic of Srpska.164  In addition, each 
republic maintains its own prime minister and national assemblies.  Effective governance 
at the federal level hinges on the cooperation of all three political organizations.   
Currently, communication and cooperation between the federal government and 
the republics is severely lacking.  A report generated by the Center for International 
Private Enterprise outlines the difficulties inherent in the Bosnian government’s 
organizational structure: 
The different governments operate in isolation from each other, hardly 
communicating, let alone developing joint policies or programs.  There is 
considerable confusion as to who is responsible for what, particularly on 
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each other.  This fragmentation of government weakens accountability: 
most citizens do not understand the system, and have no idea who to 
blame when they are dissatisfied.165   
A poll conducted in 2005 indicated that 72 percent of Bosnians feel the current 
constitution cannot work.166  From this perspective, legislation enacted by the Republic 
of Srpska Parliament to limit powers of the federal government and increase its own 
power can be viewed as an effort to circumvent the complicated organizational structure 
of the federal system.  Or, to reframe this somewhat: how can Bosnians be comfortable or 
familiar with a governance structure that they do not understand? 
C. CONCLUSION 
Given all the atrocities, ethnic cleansing, rape camps, torture, and murder, one has 
to ask: is a unified equitable Bosnian state that preserves the rights of all Bosnian 
citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, an achievable goal?  Can individual Bosniacs, 
Serbs, and Croats achieve mutual forgiveness, redemption, and common understanding? 
Although the violence has ceased, the High Representative routinely nullifies 
legislation passed through democratic processes.  Much of this legislation is blatantly 
nationalist and Bosniac or Serb in its orientation.  Meanwhile, current expectations are so 
low, that any sign of improvement in the standard of living would be welcomed.  Yet, the 
organizational design of the Bosnian state deters political participation, largely because 
its set-up is too complex. 
There is no question that halting atrocities and bringing an end to human suffering 
was a noble goal.  In the short term, the international community achieved this.  But what 
seems increasingly true is that long-term stability will only be achieved when members of 
all three of Bosnia’s constituent societies feel the government fairly looks out for their 
interests.  Unfortunately, throughout the peace negotiations in Dayton, little thought was 
given to what type of government would resonate across Bosnia’s three warring factions. 
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If careful consideration had been given to the three components of social fit, from 
the perspective of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, then the building of a governing structure 
that could lead to long-term political stability and self governance without permanent 
international pressure might have been more likely.  Clearly, this line of thinking may 
have required the development of an autonomous Islamic Bosnian state, the secession of 
Bosnian Serbs into greater Serbia, and the secession of Bosnian Croats into Croatia.  
Territorial disputes and the question of minority populations would be major sticking 
points for each faction.  But, the likelihood of achieving some form of self-governance 
and future stability may have been higher.   
In the next chapter, we examine how aligning social fit, even if by accident, can 
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V. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT FITS SOCIETY: POST-WORLD 
WAR II KOREA 
It is easier to rule a city that is used to self governing by employing its 
own citizens than by other means, assuming you do not wish to destroy 
it.167  
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 1513 
In the previous chapters, we presented examples where social fit was not achieved 
and resulted in instability (Afghanistan), or where it was partially achieved resulting in 
fragile stability (Bosnia).  In this chapter, we examine South Korea, whose post-war 
example is one where social fit was achieved and resulted in overall stability.   
Some may contend that the case of South Korea, given its ethnically homogenous 
society, is relatively uncomplicated when compared to the more ethnically complex cases 
of Afghanistan and Bosnia and thus shouldn’t be considered.  However, such a view fails 
to acknowledge the effects of regional tensions on South Korea, known as jiyeok 
gamjeong.  Jiyeok gamjeong, which translates to ‘regional sentiment,’ actually refers to 
regional discrimination.168   Present throughout Korean history, jiyeok gamjeong exerts 
an immense negative pressure on Korean society and provokes political fissures and 
“economic alienation.”169  Jiyeok gamjeong creates fissures similar to those found in 
ethnically diverse societies in the following sense: it “has produced an unequal 
distribution of resources in politics and economic development.  It affects an individual’s 
job opportunities and promotions, marriage prospects, social relations, and other aspects 
of everyday life.”170 
Another objection that might be raised vis a vis the South Korea case is that we 
are limiting the analysis of social fit to the period immediately following World War II.  
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Without question, South Korea’s adoption of a full democratic government in 1987 was 
the culmination of a long history.  Also, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea and the 
U.S. response probably did create an un-natural loyalty among South Koreans toward the 
United States.  Similarly, North Korea’s assistance to South Korea’s communist 
movements may have further solidified South Korean devotion to the idea of democracy 
while simultaneously stalling South Korea’s evolution toward democracy.  Nonetheless, 
for the purposes of this discussion post-colonial South Korea presents a case that 
demonstrates the benefits of achieving or finding a social fit.  Sometimes even 
inadvertently, the United States’ actions while governing South Korea achieved 
conditions that allowed a successful transition of authority from U.S. governance to a 
South Korean government.  
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Korea, formerly colonized by Imperial 
Japan, prepared for independence.  Two of the “big three” allies, the Soviet Union and 
the United States, divided the Korean peninsula into two regions, North and South Korea, 
which were divided by the 38th parallel.  The Soviet Union assumed responsibility for 
the northern half of Korea, which would become the country of North Korea, while the 
United States assumed responsibility for the southern region, later to become the country 
of South Korea.  From 1945–1948, the United States Army Government in Korea, 
USAMGIK, was the official governing body of South Korea.171 
B. ANALYSIS 
At this point in its history, the United States government believed that the spread 
of communism posed its greatest national security threat.  Containment of communism 
became the United States’ first priority and, ultimately, drove many USAMGIK decisions 
regarding the development of the South Korean Government.172  Focused on preventing 
Soviet expansion, the United States determined that control of the South Korean 
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population was paramount to preventing the spread of communism.  In pursuit of control, 
American authorities based their political decisions for Korea largely on whether or not 
they believed the policies would prevent a communist revolution.173  Under this 
paradigm, the United States backed President Syngman Rhee, who led South Korea’s 
first independent government after USAMGIK, from 1948 until 1960.  Later, many 
critics would argue that the United States’ policies prevented democracy from taking 
early root in South Korea, thereby ensuring a long struggle between the South Korean 
government and dissidents.174   Perhaps this is so.  But, the results today are a stable 
government and developed society.  It thus seems worthwhile to examine how something 
that has yet to be achieved in either Bosnia or Afghanistan was accomplished in South 
Korea. 
1. Ideological Resonance  
Throughout much of its history, Korea had been forced to accept foreign 
hegemony thanks to its small size and compared strength to that of its neighbors.175  For 
centuries, Korea was part of China’s tributary system, and thus, was susceptible to the 
regional giant’s influence.  The adoption of both Buddhism and Confucianism are 
examples of foreign influence on Korean society.176  In 1905, Korea became a Japanese 
protectorate following the Japanese-Russo war.  Japan officially annexed Korea as a 
colony in 1910 and ruled through its defeat in World War II.  In fact, well before this 
period “Koreans had acquired hundreds, if not thousands, of years of experience adapting 
foreign philosophies to their own needs and values.”177  Koreans’ adaptability may have 
helped ease or soften the transition to government by USAMGIK authorities.  But 
interestingly, the South Koreans deliberately adopted only American democratic  
 
 
                                                 
173 B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, 1981), 136. 
174 Brazinsky, Nation building in South Korea, 8. 
175 Ibid., 6. 
176 Ibid., 7. 
177 Ibid., 6. 
 58
principles that matched their objectives.178  Historians often suggest that the Koreans’ 
prior experiences with occupying powers allowed them to more easily adapt to American 
influence.  
While the adaptive nature of the Koreans may have facilitated USAMGIK 
success, there were still Korean values that required accommodation by USAMGIK 
authorities.  Initially, U.S. occupiers planned to use former Japanese officials to help it 
govern at all levels.  However, Korean contempt for the Japanese was so high that 
Americans in Washington and Tokyo were forced to remove all Japanese officials.179 
USAMGIK officials determined that failing to remove Japanese officials would prolong 
the establishment of effective governance and lead to resistance.  Freeing Korea from 
Japanese colonial rule was regarded as being of the highest priority.  Indeed, the greatest 
impediment to creating effective governance was the large number of Koreans who 
refused to work for Japanese supervisors.  As H Merrell Beninghoff, the then State 
Department advisor to General Hodge, wrote in his first report: 
…Although hatred of the Koreans for the Japanese is unbelievably bitter, 
it is not thought that they will resort to violence as long as American 
troops are in surveillance…All [political] groups seem to have common 
ideas of seizing Japanese property, ejecting the Japanese from Korea, and 
achieving immediate independence.  Beyond this they have few 
ideas…Korea is completely ripe for agitators.180 
The Koreans’ desire for independence from foreign influence was not limited just 
to ridding themselves of the Japanese.  Post-colonial Koreans didn’t want to be 
dominated by any other foreign state either.181  This suggests that while there was high 
contempt for the Japanese, there were strong sentiments on behalf of Korean self-rule.  
Emphasizing this point, General Hodge, the military governor of Korea under 
USAMGIK, reported on the conditions in Korea: 
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The Koreans want their independence more than any one thing and they 
want it now…By occidental standards Koreans are not ready for 
independence, but it grows daily more apparent that their capacity for self-
government will not greatly improve with time under current 
conditions.182 
Clearly, whatever form or system of governance USAMGIK established, it had to 
take into account the preeminent desires of the Koreans⎯it had to be Korean.   
2. Social Contract: Expectations 
While administering the fledgling South Korean state, USAMGIK authorities 
realized that they would have to address land reform.  A perceived inequity in the 
distribution and ownership of land was a significant issue among the Koreans.  In fact, 
every Korean political party expected some type of land reform.183  Responding to 
fevered calls for land reform, and for the distribution of former Japanese property, the 
State Department announced a new objective, which would “reflect the wishes of the 
Koreans and their desire to replace wide-spread tenancy with full ownership of the land 
by the individual farmer.”184   
USAMGIK then published two land reform plans, one directed toward land 
formerly held by Japanese owners, and one directed toward Korean landlords.185  
Dividing the Japanese held land among Korean landowners and peasants addressed the 
first problem.  The second problem was addressed by, Ordinance #9, which stated:  “A 
national emergency in Korea is hereby declared to exist by reason of oppressive rents and 
interest rates payable under existing land relationships.”186  Under Ordinance #9, rent 
was limited to 1/3 of the total crops harvested and landlords were prevented from 
arbitrarily voiding contracts with tenants.187 
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The distribution of formerly held Japanese land “did much to reduce rural 
instability, it undermined communist influence among the peasants, increased their 
cooperation with the election process, and aroused expectations, later fulfilled, that land 
owned by Korean landlords would be disposed of similarly.”188  Land reform policies 
enacted under USAMGIK proved popular enough that they were continued under the 
Rhee regime.  Rhee’s motivations for continuing land redistribution were political in 
nature.  Through redistribution, Rhee was able to reduce the power of rivals, while at the 
same time maintaining his support among peasants.  In addition, the land reforms 
alleviated a critical source of social discontent.189  By 1958, full or half tenancy dropped 
from 67.2 percent in 1945 to 15.3 percent.190 
3. Comfort and Familiarity 
The United States’ primary goal while administering the South Korean state was 
to implement enough government controls to deter the spread of communism.  Anti-
communism was reflected in every American decision regarding the growth of the “new” 
South Korean government.  Thirty-six years of Japanese colonial control proved useful in 
post-WW II South Korea, since Koreans had grown familiar with the concepts and 
processes of being governed.  During colonial rule, Japanese officials introduced Koreans 
to heavy industry and exposed them to Japanese colonial bureaucracy.191  “Japanese 
colonialism exposed Koreans to a highly authoritarian model of development that 
continued to influence their thinking when they encountered American nation 
builders.”192   In effect, Korean society was accustomed to centralized governance. 
Upon U.S. occupation, the government in South Korea was in disarray.  Ninety 
percent of the bureaucratic work force was absent, and those few who remained would 
not carry out their duties.  Most of the public departments could not function; and public 
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services were cancelled.193  The resulting complete disorder heightened the urgent need 
to establish a functioning government structure.  While neither popular nor what it had 
originally planned to do, USAMGIK chose to maintain the structure put in place by the 
Japanese.  This structure was at least composed of a bureaucracy that could exert control 
over key aspects of the economy and society.  It also could subordinate people and other 
political parties to central government authority.194  In other words, structure inherited 
from the Japanese, purged of the Japanese themselves, provided the Koreans with a 
functioning government and Americans with relatively immediate control. 
We can see how this worked when we look at law and order.  Towards the end of 
1945, USAMGIK established the Korean Departments of Justice, Courts, and National 
Police.195  This amounted to Koreanization; Koreans were simply put in charge of former 
colonial agencies, with little change to the underlying organizations.  In fact, Americans 
made few significant changes in structure or personnel through the end of occupation.  It 
appears that USAMGIK even retained Koreans formerly employed in the Japanese 
Bureau of Justice despite the concern that most were viewed as Japanese collaborators.  
The U.S. occupation forces also used a system of law codes and precedents created by 
combining Japanese law and USAMGIK powers; only the harshest and most improper 
colonial laws, such as those based on race, were adjusted by direction of theU.S..196  In 
short, USAMGIK appropriated the existing organizations and laws. 
While USAMGIK generally maintained the colonial-era government bureaucracy, 
there were instances when the U.S. attempted to introduce new policies.  Often these 
resulted in unintended and damaging effects.  For instance, in what was referred to as the 
“most unwise pieces of economic legislation ever decreed by the Americans in Korea,” 
USAMGIK removed Japanese controls on rice.197  According to historian, Bruce 
Cumings, “the free market plan stands as a classic example of the costs associated with 
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imposing assumptions and models developed in one setting and then pushed into another 
alien and radically different setting.”198  Subsistence farming by Korean peasants and 
marketing by landlords continued but without the previous controls in place.  Ultimately, 
this caused hoarding and overconsumption, inflation, near starvation, and an economic 
breakdown.  Eventually, the U.S. military government suspended the free market on rice 
and revived the Japanese system of agricultural management.199   In the wake of Japanese 
imperialism, the structure of government most familiar to the Koreans was authoritarian; 
anything more democratic than this would have felt uncomfortable.  As counter-intuitive 
as it may seem, Koreans responded favorably to strong centralized rule. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The discussion of post-World War II South Korea could give the impression that 
U.S. intervention was overwhelmingly positive and enabled a smooth transition.  This, 
however, is not the case; the U.S. made numerous mistakes and none paid more for it 
than the Koreans.  In addition to tactical mistakes made by the military, the United States 
made poor policy decisions with long-lasting effects.   
Although the transition from U.S. to Korean authority accomplished the goal of 
thwarting communism, it established an authoritarian regime in South Korea.  
Throughout the transition process, the United States sided with Korean conservatives, 
who previously had collaborated with the Japanese imperialists.200  Many Koreans 
viewed the U.S. backed conservatives as traitors and, thus, became wary of both the U.S. 
and Korean governments.  The United States believed Syngman Rhee was the only figure 
politically strong enough to prevent the Korean leftists from gaining power.201  As a 
staunch conservative and anti-communist, Rhee prevented the spread of communism, but 
also severely frustrated the spread of democracy.202  Many Koreans viewed Rhee as 
nothing more than a dictator, who cared little for the people and needed to use heavy-
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handed methods to maintain security and control.203  In the end, the Rhee regime did 
little to develop South Korea, or advance Korea’s interests.  Like most dictators, Rhee 
focused on maintaining power and privilege.204   Regardless, his accession to power was 
a tacit recognition by the U.S. of South Koreans’ desire for self-governance and allowed 
for a Korean solution to a Korean problem, which ultimately paved the way to political 
development and stability.  
Given the fervent anti-colonialism in post-World War II Korea, simply 
establishing a governance structure led by Koreans ideologically resonated with most 
members of Korean society.  Though a dictatorship, the Rhee Regime was Korean and 
incorporated Koreans into all government institutions.  From the U.S. perspective, the 
transition from U.S. to Korean authority was a success.  
Again, what helped make it a success was the way in which, USAMGIK 
addressed Koreans’ expectations for land reform.  Ultimately, the reforms reduced rural 
instability and communist influence.  Had the authorities failed to address land reform, it 
is likely that South Koreans would have rejected the new government.   
USAMGIK’s decision to continue to make use of the formerly Japanese 
bureaucracy and laws provided a system that Koreans were comfortable and familiar 
with.  A strong centralized government seemed largely effective in maintaining control.  
Additionally, the removal of Japanese supervisors and officials made this especially 
palatable.  Had the Japanese officials remained, it is unlikely the government would have 
functioned, due to the unwillingness of the Koreans to work under Japanese supervisors.  
The economic chaos that resulted from removing Japanese imposed controls on the rice 
economy shows what happened when the U.S. deviated from a familiar and accepted 
practice to an unfamiliar free market.  The unexpected result was near starvation.  
Revival of the Japanese control mechanisms returned balance and moved the South 
Koreans back towards a familiar structure.   
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The point here is not that USAMGIK made perfect decisions regarding 
governance, or that Syngman Rhee was an ideal leader, but rather that the system of 
government fit Korean society.  Some decisions were made out of necessity and not 
through deliberate planning.  Some decisions, such as the removal of controls on the rice 
economy, were incorrect and resulted in disaster, but once identified were reversed. 
Regardless of why these decisions were made, the end result was a set of solutions that 
created a social fit.   
One counterfactual question that can be posed is whether USAMGIK could have 
been smarter by design rather than by accident.  Recognizing and accommodating Korean 
core values allowed USAMGIK to make decisions that fulfilled South Koreans’ 
expectations.  While various circumstances drove USAMGIK decision-making, use of a 
guiding framework based on achieving a social fit, could have provided a more 
systematic and deliberate process for developing policy.  Had USAMGIK understood the 
significance of social fit, and pursued courses of action that deliberately sought to achieve 
ideological resonance, and fulfill Koreans’ expectations for a social contract that took 
into account what would feel comfortable and familiar, they could have anticipated and 
successfully made the same critical decisions, without having to rely on “luck.” 
In an effort to maximize ideological resonance, USAMGIK could have identified 
critical South Korean values and beliefs that were bound to affect governance.  
USAMGIK could have minimized the amount of time it would take to implement an 
effective transition to a Korean regime.  Similarly, USAMGIK would have been able to 
anticipate how important it was to govern without former Japanese colonial officials.   
To maintain the new government’s social contract with the people, USAMGIK 
could have studied southern Koreans expectations’ of a government.  It would have 
immediately been able to identify land reform as a popular and expected function of 
government.  USAMGIK’s concern for land reform did provide the government with 
credibility.  Potentially, earlier awareness could have better focused USAMGIK attention 
and resources towards significant endeavors such as land reform.  
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Recognizing what was familiar to the Koreans could have helped USAMGIK 
understand better that change in the system should only occur when and where absolutely 
necessary.  The South Koreans understood how the Japanese system worked.  It had 
already proven effective, and with the exception of Japanese supervisors, the Koreans 
were comfortable with it.  Thus, prior to occupation, USAMGIK could have planned to 
use the pre-existing bureaucracy.  Similarly, USAMGIK would have been able to avoid 
changing to a free market economy on rice, which was unproven and untested, and 
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
From this institution of a common-wealth are derived all the rights, and 
faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the 
consent of the people assembled.205 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1651 
In the three cases presented: we have one instance of no social fit with instability; 
one instance of insufficient social fit with fragile stability; and one instance of social fit 
with stability.  All three can be neatly arranged along a continuum with Afghanistan at 
one end, Bosnia in the middle, and South Korea at the other end.  However, doing so 
pays insufficient attention to what constitutes social fit in each case.  For example, in 
Afghanistan, social fit has been hard to achieve thanks to local versus central tensions, 
and in Bosnia, nationalism has been the problem, while in South Korea, it was land 
reform that helped to do the trick, but it would not have worked in the other two cases. 
The current tensions in Afghanistan exemplify what can happen when a post-
conflict government is imposed and does not socially fit the society.  Ideologically, the 
Afghans struggle to support the central government’s dominance over traditional tribal 
authorities and traditional local autonomy.  Additionally, the rural Afghans largely resent 
social restructuring.  The government’s failure to adequately provide security and 
dispense justice does not meet most Afghans’ expectations.  Perhaps this is the 
consequence of Kabul trying to apply a system with which Afghans are neither 
comfortable nor familiar.  The Taliban takes advantage of, and capitalizes on, these 
fissures between the Afghan state and society.  Overall, the government requires heavy 
foreign oversight and intervention to assist it in combating a full-blown violent 
insurgency. 
In Bosnia, the international community’s political solution has failed to 
adequately address Bosnian desires for ethnic nationalism, specifically the desires for  
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separate ethnically independent states.  The complicated government structure engineered 
by outsiders appears to function, in that it has halted the violence, but deters participation 
by Bosnians and requires continuous foreign oversight. 
Ironically, it is cold war-era South Korea that offers an example of social fit.  In 
the wake of World War II, USAMGIK authorities created a post-conflict government 
modeled after the previous colonial power, whose form and actions fit South Koreans at 
that time.  The South Koreans required a strong centralized government.  USAMGIK 
removed previous Japanese administrators from their posts, despite their competence; 
USAMGIK did so in order to build trust or resonance with the Korean population.  In 
addition, the government addressed land reform, which was among the most pressing 
issues for South Koreans. 
As these three disparate cases should make clear, what ultimately constitutes 
social fit varies as widely as the post-conflict societies themselves.  In Afghanistan, what 
matters is the tension between local and central authorities, in Bosnia it is ethnic 
nationalism, and in South Korea it was land reform.  What worked in South Korea will 
not work in Bosnia or Afghanistan.  History has shown that a repressive centralized 
regime modeled after the post-World War II South Korean Regime would only incite 
continued resistance in Afghanistan.  Likewise, the costs associated with instituting 
caretaker/peacekeeping superstructure, as still exists in Bosnia, would be prohibitive in 
the significantly large much less developed Afghanistan.  Thus, specific lessons learned 
from one case can’t be applied to another.  However, taking into account the three 
components of social fit could aid policymakers in determining which specific details to 
ascertain about a society in order to help it create a viable post-conflict government. 
A. APPLYING SOCIAL FIT: AFGHANISTAN 
Indeed, the only thing that could potentially ameliorate the situation in 
Afghanistan is a different form of governance that takes social fit into account.  
Transitioning to a bottom-up form of governance could reduce the likelihood of 
resistance to top down policy.  Allowing Afghans within a village to determine what is or 
is not acceptable behavior would remove the perception of a threat or an assault on their 
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identity or way of life.  Giving Afghans the local right to self-determinate would carry 
certain inherent risks for the international community.  There would be the real 
possibility of a return to draconian self-policing and administering of justice.  The role of 
women and girls in society might change.  However, as with the policies of Nadir Shah 
and Zahir Shah, gradual social reform would still remain possible, particularly in urban 
areas.  Similar even to what we see with societal norms in the United States, certain areas 
would likely maintain a more conservative approach to governance, while other areas 
would adopt a more liberal approach.  Some areas of Afghanistan would likely subscribe 
to the strictest interpretations of Shari’a, while other areas might take on a more secular 
aspect approach.  History has shown that gradual social reform can occur when it follows 
a natural progression. 
Currently, power in Afghanistan is largely decentralized.  The near xenophobic 
tendency of Afghan tribesmen almost necessitates a degree of autonomy.  Again, history 
shows that any attempt to alter the status quo or reform society is often met with rapid 
resistance and instability.  The option presented by focusing on social fit harnesses the 
strength of local power structures.  Under the strategy of increased self-governance, 
Afghanistan would become a decentralized state in which the primary power would 
remain in several autonomous regions and the national government would essentially be 
federal in nature, or a hybrid mix between a federation and a loose confederation of the 
autonomous regions.  A federal political order, where “political organization is marked 
by the combination of shared rule and self-rule,” could potentially limit sources of 
resistance to centralized rule.206  A new Confederation of Tribes would likely govern on 
the basis of consensus.  The process for transitioning to this model would doubtless be 
difficult, but not insurmountable.  
The recommendations briefly described below provide additional ways in which 
the current Afghan government might achieve a better social fit with Afghan society.  All 
of them focus on decentralizing while still maintaining an Afghan state.  There is a 
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balance that must be struck between decentralization and retaining state authority.  
Potential dangers exist when the state decentralizes too far; it might disintegrate. 
1. Political Reform 
Shifting away from centralization requires changes in the political dynamic.  
Currently, President Karzai’s powers include the ability to “appoint cabinet ministers and 
members of the Supreme Court (subject to National Assembly confirmation), provincial 
governors and district governors, as well as local security chiefs.”207  The National 
Assembly provides some checks on the powers of the President.  However, the President 
also appoints one-third of the upper house.208  Under a centralized system, this political 
power makes sense.  Nonetheless it also limits the incorporation of traditional tribal 
structures.  If tribal councils retained the right to appoint district representatives to the 
federal government, it thus would bring them into the fold and help the political process 
attain greater legitimacy.  Ideally, a village should determine who will serve as its 
representative (most likely an elder), a collection of villages should determine who will 
represent them to the district, and a collection of districts should determine who will 
represent the people to the province.  National elections and individual votes need not 
occur.  The representative process just described harnesses the socially accepted 
tendencies of Afghans to govern by way of consensus in accordance with Pashtunwali, 
and by utilizing the tenet of jirga (council based on the Greek form of democracy).209  
Following this process would ultimately produce a Confederation of Tribes under a 
collective federal structure.  Essentially, federalism would provide the means by which 
the autonomous nature of each region in Afghanistan would be acknowledged and 
respected, thus minimizing the possibility of political opposition to the state itself.  
Arguably, the most difficult task in implementing this transition would be incorporating 
warlords, the Taliban, and insurgents into the political process.  However, each of these 
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mentioned entities maintains some degree of allegiance to the traditional power structures 
already, and therefore might be convinced to support efforts to create the Confederation. 
2. Security 
It has been said that brothers may fight each other, but when faced with the threat 
of a third party, the brothers will unite to face the threat.  The threat can be physical, as in 
the introduction of foreign forces, but also may be a perceived loss of influence over their 
way of life.210  This saying accurately describes what foreign forces often face in 
Afghanistan.  The intervention of foreign forces often generates this unintended yet acute 
sense of resistance.  Military mistakes resulting in civilian casualties, or the perception 
that the foreign force is favoring a corrupt political system, often serves to unify rather 
than pacify the opposition.  In a recent HBO documentary entitled The Battle for Marjah, 
interviews with Afghans living in Marjah provide insight into this dynamic.  As one 
Afghan lamented, “How can we stand against the Taliban?  They are sons of 
Afghanistan.  They provide justice and order.  Who will provide this now?  The 
Marines?”211   
Attempts by international forces to solve local problems with international 
solutions are not likely to work.  Instead, we should provide an opportunity for Afghans 
to solve what is fundamentally an Afghan problem.  There is no doubt that, as foreign 
forces withdraw from localities, there will be violence as Afghans sort out their power 
structures.  This is unavoidable, but necessary for Afghans’ pursuit of self-determination 
and self-governance.  And, tools exist to minimize the extent of violence.  For instance, 
the Afghan National Police, under the authority of the Confederation, would also 
decentralize.  Similar to law enforcement in other countries, where local sheriffs and 
police provide most security, local police forces would exist under the authority of the  
 
 
                                                 
210 Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era 
of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 99 and 98. 
211 Anthony Wonke and Ben Anderson, “The Battle for Marjah,” Documentary (Marjah, Afghanistan: 
HBO, 2011). 
 72
jirga or shura for each village and district within a province.  The Federal-Confederation 
would retain authority to deploy the National Army.  As elsewhere, the National Army 
could exist to provide for the common defense of Afghanistan. 
This is not to say that all foreign forces should immediately withdraw from 
Afghanistan.  Afghans will continue to need advice and guidance.  But as foreign forces 
remain, it should be as advisors at the provincial and division level with limited 
exceptions.  This would compel Afghans to have to develop their own federal methods.  
NATO forces should stand by to support the Confederation of Tribes, but only when and 
where their involvement supports Afghan solutions.  Current village stability operations 
provide an example of an exception where the employment of foreign forces can succeed 
in assisting Afghans with local governance and security issues. 
Decentralization carries inherent risks in terms of international terrorism.  It must 
be made clear to the new Confederation of Tribes that while the international community 
respects Afghanistan’s sovereignty and supports its right to self-govern, any support for 
international terrorists will result in limited, yet surgical, military action by the 
international community. 
3. Development and Revenue Sharing 
Avoiding complete disintegration of the Confederation would require multiple, 
mutually beneficial, incentives to remain united.  Economic cooperation may provide the 
basis for this.  Contrary to popular belief, Afghanistan has significant natural resources.  
Eastern Afghanistan has large troves of timber, natural gas deposits, mineral deposits, 
and precious gem mines.  Rugged terrain and the lack of security prevent the controlled 
harvest of these resources.  It is estimated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
that there is 3.532 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Afghanistan.212 In addition, there 
are over 1000 known mines and mineral deposits in Afghanistan.213 Emeralds, sapphires, 
rubies, and marble are but a few of the mineral to be found.  Current practices in the 
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mineral and timber trades can be described as archaic.  Timber, for instance, is often 
harvested using little or no technology.  The Afghan Confederation could produce a 
relatively stable revenue stream if it regulated these natural resources.  In a stable 
environment, foreign investment and the latest technological advancements could also be 
brought to bear.   
Currently, Afghanistan is losing resources to smuggling.  The landowners and 
warlords who control these resource-rich regions control the citizenry in these locations.  
Loss of revenue and a lack of social control in these areas is not the worst of it.  It is 
widely believed that the Pakistan Taliban is reaping the benefits of these natural 
resources.214   
Under the authority of the Confederation of Tribes, the members of the 
confederation could negotiate partnerships with each other and the landowners in areas 
where resources exist.  An example of ways in which this could occur includes licensing 
and leasing arrangements.  Ultimately, control of revenue translates into social control.215  
If the Confederation controls the money and resources the citizens need for survival, then 
the Confederation may maintain enough strength to remain united. 
4. Improve Transportation Infrastructure 
In conjunction with gaining control of the Confederation’s natural resources, 
transportation has to be improved.  A more robust transportation infrastructure would 
facilitate the efficient movement of resources to market.  Additional benefits include jobs 
to improve the roads, ease of travel for workers, and increased trade.  Currently, it is 
reported that General David Petraeus will implement some form of transportation 
improvement as part of his regional development plan.216  To the degree possible, the 
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Afghan Confederation should run this effort with localized security.  If the international 
community runs this, the unintended consequence will be to undermine Afghan control. 
Invariably, the more the Confederation can do, the more the Afghans will rely on 
the Confederation for jobs and income.  This co-dependence would affirm the social 
contract, which in turn would help strengthen the Confederation. 
The recommendations just suggested are designed to address the fractures 
between state and society we identified in Chapter III.  An Afghan central government 
based on a liberal framework represents and ideological mismatch and cannot satisfy 
Afghans expectations.  Policies and reforms driven from the top down by political 
appointees are completely unfamiliar to members of a society used to making decisions 
based on consensus.  After 10 years of war, the competition between the Afghan state and 
the Afghan society is no closer to resolution than it has ever been.  Considering social fit 
will likely change the environment from competition to cooperation. 
B. BEYOND AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan would seem to epitomize a case where social fit was not 
considered⎯to our detriment.  Now, consider what could be accomplished if social fit 
was used as a planning tool prior to a 10-year counterinsurgent struggle.  For instance, 
the current uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa can be analyzed in terms of 
social fit.  From our (Western) perspective, recent demonstrations appear to reveal a 
popular desire for freedom, and attract our sympathies.  Should they attract our support? 
To determine whether (or how) to intervene in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, or Libya 
should require first asking what form of governance fits each of these societies.  In the 
case of Libya, 97 percent of Libyans identify themselves as Sunni Muslim from Arab-
Berber descent.217  We should be able to safely say the role of Islam will be a significant 
factor in the adoption of a new government.  According to social fit, Islam ideologically 
resonates with Libyans.  Should the Libyan state collapse, a political and social power 
vacuum will likely occur.  In the absence of clear authority, law and order will 
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deteriorate.  As occurred in Afghanistan following the collapse of the Nagibullah regime, 
lawlessness, disruption of essential services, and criminal activity will likely escalate. 
On March 29, 2011, the Libyan opposition released “A Vision of a Democratic 
Libya,” in which democracy, human rights, and secularism are mentioned.218  The 
parallels between the current Libyan situation and the Iranian Revolution are worth 
noting.  Just as the liberal leadership of the current rebellion professes liberal ideals, the 
leaders of the Iranian Revolution in 1978 “called for the rule of law, the return of basic 
freedoms, respect for the dignity of the individual, and a concern for social justice.”219  In 
Iran’s case, and now in Libya’s, each group’s conception of democracy and human rights 
is subject to local interpretation and implementation.  In other words, we should not take 
pledges of these ideals at face value.  Additionally, despite statements from the rebels’ 
self-appointed leaders, freelance jihadists and fundamentalists are infiltrating their 
ranks.220  Reporting indicates that members of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have joined the 
cause.221 
It is easy to see why Islamists would support the rebels’ efforts.   Fundamentalists 
see the dictatorships in the Middle East as roadblocks to the advancement of the 
Caliphate.222  The international community, meanwhile, wants the dictatorships to fall in 
order to pave the way for “Freedom.”  Ultimately, the societies themselves will determine 
which way they will go.  History suggests that it is unreasonably optimistic to assume 
that Western values and norms, individual rights, human rights, and secularization will 
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gain more traction than will a system grounded in Muslim values.223  After all, the Koran 
and Shari’a provide the “doctrine” for instituting the order that Libyan society is most 
comfortable and familiar with.  As in Iran in 1979, “when the constituted Iranian 
governmental institutions collapsed, mosque based organizations served the purpose of 
maintaining order, providing basic services, and defending the new revolutionary 
regime.”224 
So, if we look at Libya through the social fit lens, Islam ideologically resonates, 
and Shari’a is familiar to Libyans already.  The freedom to espouse fundamentalist ideals, 
made possible by the collapse of the regime and in the absence of clear authority, could 
well pave the way for a theocratic state.  Why would Libyans accept this?  Ultimately, 
societies acceptance of non-democratic government may be directly tied to whoever can 
provide social organization and order, thereby ensuring social fit.  
If the United States and the international community deem a theocratic state more 
valuable than the current regime, then intervention is the correct choice, since the rise of 
a religiously based resistance is the likeliest outcomes of our interference.  If, however, a 
theocratic state is not desirable, then perhaps an alternative course of action is required.  
Understanding social fit does not provide the answer to these foreign policy questions, 
but merely highlights what should be considered. 
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